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Query complexity is a common tool for comparing quantum and classical computation, and it has produced
many examples of how quantum algorithms differ from classical ones. Here we investigate in detail the role
that oracles play for the advantage of quantum algorithms. We do so by using a simulation framework,
Quantum Simulation Logic (QSL), to construct oracles and algorithms that solve some problems with
the same success probability and number of queries as the quantum algorithms. The framework can be
simulated using only classical resources at a constant overhead as compared to the quantum resources
used in quantum computation. Our results clarify the assumptions made and the conditions needed
when using quantum oracles. Using the same assumptions on oracles within the simulation framework we
show that for some specific algorithms, like the Deutsch-Jozsa and Simon’s algorithms, there simply
is no advantage in terms of query complexity. This does not detract from the fact that quantum query
complexity provides examples of how a quantum computer can be expected to behave, which in turn
has proved useful for finding new quantum algorithms outside of the oracle paradigm, where the most
prominent example is Shor’s algorithm for integer factorization.
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One of the main problems in quantum information the-
ory is to understand the resources needed for quantum
computation. Here, a resource is a property used to en-
able the computational speed-up, usually described as
something consumed by the computation, but it could
also be a static resource: a property present in one com-
putational model but absent in another. Some properties
that have been proposed as resources for quantum com-
putation are interference [1], entanglement [2], nonlocal-
ity [3], contextuality [4–6], and even coherence [7, 8]. It
could also be that different algorithms makes use of dif-
ferent resources, or different combinations of resources,
which further motivates resource studies in the context
of specific algorithms.
From our perspective contextuality is clearly a top
contender. If contextuality is the intrinsic property that
gives quantum computers their advantage one would
expect to find evidence of this even in simple algo-
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rithms. Our first attempt to study this started with
the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm [9, 10], that determines
whether a given function is constant or balanced. This
was the first proposed quantum algorithm that showed
an exponential speed-up compared to the best-known
classical algorithm, although this speed-up only holds
when requiring the solution to be deterministic. There
are existing results on resources for this algorithm, for
example, Collins et al. [11] shows that for one and two
qubits there is one implementation where entanglement
is not needed. While this does not rule out implemen-
tations where entanglement is present, it does show that
entanglement is not strictly needed for the algorithm to
work. The question remains if contextuality is needed.
Notable is that for one- and two-qubit input, the ora-
cles can be implemented with a stabilizer circuit, and
while stabilizer circuits can be efficiently simulated [12],
they can also produce phenomena like nonlocal and, in
particular, contextual correlations. A similar framework,
closely related to the stabilizer subtheory, is Spekkens’
model [13] which contains similar transformations, but
does not produce nonlocal and contextual correlations.
Spekkens’ model gives the same behavior as the stabilizer
subtheory of quantum mechanics for one- and two-qubit
input functions.
Our question at this point was simply: what needs
to be added to Spekkens’ model to enable three-qubit
inputs (or larger). To our surprise, what was needed was
to add a new gate to Spekkens’ model [14], without al-
lowing for nonlocal correlations and without making it
contextual. This addition enables all balanced functions
on an arbitrarily large input, not only a subset thereof.
In our paper, we show that for each problem instance
there exists a realization in this new extended model, so
that all balanced and constant functions at any size of
the input can be reproduced. In addition, we show that
the standard Deutsch-Jozsa quantum algorithm, using
the gates of the model, solves the problem with a single
query.
Since nonlocal and contextual correlations are mani-
festly absent from the framework, the possibility of stat-
ing and solving each problem instance within the model,
rules out these properties from being enabling properties.
As before, this does not rule out implementations where
entanglement or contextuality is present, but shows that
they are not strictly needed.
Further, the model can be efficiently simulated on a
classical probabilistic Turing machine, i.e., the algorithm
is efficiently simulatable in a classical probabilistic Tur-
ing machine — with constant overhead — meaning that
there is no speed-up when comparing to the algorithm
run on a quantum Turing machine.
Having established this framework, we turned to a
second algorithm, Simon’s algorithm [15, 16] that finds
the generator of a hidden order-two subgroup. This algo-
rithm is usually portrayed as the poster-child for quan-
tum exponential speed-up, and is regarded as stronger
evidence since the speed-up remains even if the solu-
tion is accepted with a bounded error-probability. Also
here our framework reproduces the behavior of Simon’s
quantum algorithm [14]. Thus, contextuality is not
needed, and the algorithm is efficiently simulatable in
a classical probabilistic Turing machine.
Both algorithms assume access to the function
through a black-box oracle, meaning that the solver only
has access to the function’s input and output, not the
internal structure of the oracle.
The framework used in [14] is limited and puts hard
structural constraints on the setup. In this paper, we
extend the framework, allowing for a less strict setup re-
sulting in an approximation that gives predictions closer
to those of quantum theory. This builds further on the
main idea of [14] that the resources needed is the ability
to choose to store, process, and retrieve information from
an additional information-carrying degree-of-freedom of
the physical system.
We begin with some preliminaries (Section 1) and
a thorough introduction to our framework (Section 2).
We then start with a simple oracle problem called the
Bernstein-Vazirani problem (Section 3), for which
our model completely reproduces the results of the quan-
tum algorithm. We also show that our approach works
even when Deutsch-Jozsa is considered both as a
promise problem and as a decision problem (see Sec-
tion 4). For Grover Search there is a speed-up, but
not as much as in the quantum case (Section 6), and also
for Simon’s problem our model completely reproduces
the results of the quantum algorithm (Section 7).
A more pressing question that these results point to,
is whether the oracle model really can produce conclusive
evidence for a separation between quantum and classical
computation. We tend to believe it cannot, and defi-
nitely not for Deutsch-Jozsa and Simon’s problems,
see the discussion in Section 5. However, quantum al-
gorithms that produce bounds for quantum query com-
plexity do provide us with examples of how a quantum
computer could be expected to behave, and inspire us to
invent new approaches to non-relativized computational
problems. Shor’s algorithm[17, 18] is one such example.
We do point out that there is no principal reason pro-
hibiting our model (or a similar one) to have an effect
outside of the oracle paradigm, and that our model is
best compared with a construction suffering from sys-
tematic errors. In this spirit, we compare our framework
with a current state-of-the-art implementation of Shor’s
algorithm (Section 8).
1 Preliminaries
In this section we go through some relevant theory help-
ful to understand the content of this paper, namely the
concepts of Turing machines and oracles, and also a brief
introduction to quantum computation.
1.1 Turing Machines
The concepts of Probabilistic Turing Machines (PTMs)
and Quantum Turing Machines (QTMs) are essential
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here. While it is possible to use the formal notion of
a Turing Machine that manipulates classical or quantum
symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules,
the comparison is made simpler by using the presentation
of Bernstein and Vazirani [19, 20].
In their physics-like view of a PTM, they describe
its time evolution as a sequence of probability distribu-
tions. At each time step, the distribution describes the
likelihood of the machine’s configuration, and the prob-
ability assigned to any specific configuration is a real
number in [0, 1], to within a precision of 2−m for some
integer m. With a machine able to do coin-flips, these
numbers are reachable with a deterministic algorithm in
time polynomial in m. The probability distribution over
all configurations at time t is represented by a vector ~vt.
The transition function taking the machine into the next
configuration can be thought of as a stochastic matrix M
whose rows and columns index configurations, entries are
probabilities, and the columns sum to one.
Bernstein and Vazirani point out that stochastic ma-
trices obtained from probabilistic TM are finitely spec-
ified and map each configuration by making only local
changes to it, but even so, the support of the probability
distribution can be exponential in the running time of the
machine. Observing the PTM (or part of it) at a time
step will yield a configuration (or partial configuration)
sampled from the probability distribution, and the dis-
tribution is updated conditioned on the value observed,
i.e., sampling shrinks the support of the distribution to
only cover the observed configuration. This update does
not change the future behavior of the machine, because
the involved probabilities are additive. It is therefore
only necessary to keep track of which configuration the
machine is in, at each time step. So, even though the dis-
tribution may have a support that grows exponentially
with running time, it is only necessary to keep track of
a constant amount of information to trace the behavior
of the machine as time progresses.
A similar physics-like view of a QTM assigns com-
plex numbers called amplitudes, instead of probabilities,
to the possible configurations. The resulting vector of
complex amplitudes describes the QTM’s quantum state
at each time step, as a linear combination of configura-
tions known as a superposition, and the probability of
observing a specific configuration is given by the abso-
lute square of its amplitude [21]. Further, observation
of a measurement outcome enforces the state of the ma-
chine to be updated to be consistent with the outcome
according to Lu¨ders rule [22]. The quantum time evolu-
tion needs to keep track of the amplitude and phase of
all the configurations because the involved quantities are
not only added to each other; the components may can-
cel each other because of the phase. This phenomenon
is known as interference, and is needed to reproduce
the quantum behavior. Observation would restrict the
configuration so that the interference is prohibited and
therefore, in a QTM, observation may disturb its state
and its later behavior. The result is that the possible ex-
ponential growth of the superposition support needs to
be retained to reproduce the complete quantum behav-
ior. In other words, it may be necessary to keep track
of an exponentially increasing amount of information to
trace the behavior of the machine as time progresses.
More details and the correspondence with the formal
Turing Machine model can be found in Bernstein and
Vazirani [19, 20]. In what follows the time evolution will
be divided into chunks known as gates as we will be us-
ing the circuit model of quantum computation. This has
been shown to be polynomially equivalent to the QTM
model by Yao [23].
1.2 Oracle Turing Machines and oracle
notions
A brief deviation into the standard definition of an oracle
TM is needed, before we translate it into the physics-like
description. A formal definition can be found in Arora
and Barak [24, p. 73], but here we will adopt the more
suitable description of [25]. An oracle TM has a special
query tape and two distinguished internal states: a pre-
query state and a post-query state. A query is executed
whenever the machine enters the pre-query state, and
causes the oracle f to evaluate the query string present
on the query tape (if no query is present the oracle per-
forms a no-op). The query string should be written in
the form x||b, i.e., the input to the oracle x concatenated
with a target bit b, commonly initialized to 0, onto which
the oracle’s answer is added modulo two. (Except for the
query tape and change of internal state from pre- to post-
query state, other parts of the oracle TM do not change
during the query.) The target bit is strictly speaking not
needed for a classical oracle TM, since the answer could
be overwritten onto the space used for the query string,
but it can be added without loss of generality. More im-
portantly, the target bit enables reversion of the oracle,
sometimes known as “uncomputation” [26], since the in-
put equals x and the target bit is already equal to f(x),
calling the oracle again will reset the target bit to 0. Ex-
tending this to several target bits is simple and can be
done at a linear cost corresponding to one evaluation per
target bit, most presentations condense this to a single
evaluation per target bitstring.
Informally [25] an oracle is a device that lets the ma-
chine evaluate some function at unit cost. Effectively, us-
ing an oracle the question becomes: if we could compute
this function efficiently, what else could we then com-
pute? With this in mind, oracles can be thought of as
a tool used to calculate a lower bound on the resource
requirement.
Reformulating this in the already mentioned physics-
like description, we describe the evaluation of the oracle
as a change in a single time-step, so that the evaluation
has unit cost. We will later implement this physics-like
description in terms of quantum or classical reversible
gates that specify the map in each time-step. In this
circuit model, an oracle constitutes a part of the circuit
that counts as one single gate when analyzing its resource
requirements. Normally, a circuit implementation of a
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function f uses a query register from which the input is
read, and an answer register where the result is added,
bitwise modulo two (see Figure 1). The query register
remains unchanged by the gate; this enables reversibil-
ity of the circuit implementation even for non-bijective
functions, similar to the oracle TM model above. A sim-
ple extension of the argument of Yao [23] can be used
to show that this model is polynomially equivalent with
the oracle TM model, taking into account that each out-
put bit needs to be handled by a separate oracle in the
formal model.
Input-register
Output-register Function output
Unchanged
f
...
...
...
...
f
Figure 1: A classical reversible logical function con-
struction for a function f .
In oracle query complexity the relevant quantity is the
number of calls an algorithm makes to the oracle. Each
call is counted as one operation, or one unit of time, and
this is the measure that will be used throughout this pa-
per. As mentioned above, most of the problems that we
will consider are decision and promise problems. The
solver of a promise problem is guaranteed that the func-
tion is one of a few possible types, and the problem is to
determine which it is.
It is conventional in computational complexity to
consider the oracle as a black box. Sometimes how-
ever, and especially in the related field of cryptography, a
wider definition is used to better capture the problem. In
the context of analyzing the security of a cryptographic
algorithm, an attack model or security model needs to
be specified, stating assumptions on the power, knowl-
edge, and access to the system available to an adversary.
Chow et al. [27] explains that in the black-box model the
adversary is restricted to observe input and output from
the cryptographic algorithm, in contrast to the white-
box model where he or she is assumed to have complete
access to both the specific software implementation, and
to the running environment of the algorithm. A gray-
box model is a mixture between these two extremes, and
applicable whenever the adversary has access to some
internal details of the algorithm, but not all.
As an example, consider that we know (are promised)
the mapping of a cryptographic function and the prob-
lem is to determine an input parameter (a key) based
on the output of the function. If access is given to the
function in the form of a black-box, then the problem
is usually intractable. However, if the function runs on
some hardware, then a more realistic model is that we
can monitor its power consumption. This additional in-
formation may open up for a side-channel attack known
as power analysis; information about the key leaks out
through the power consumption, and retrieving the key
becomes tractable (see e.g., [28]). Side channels natu-
rally appear when the protocol is implemented in a phys-
ical system. This is an example of a gray-box model since
it only requires having an incomplete description of the
machinery, we only need to have knowledge about the
side effect resulting from the physical implementation,
and not the full description as in the white-box model.
Another example where these notions fit well is com-
putational modeling and system identification [29, p. 43],
where the goal is instead to model or identify a process.
In the white-box setting, we have complete knowledge
about the process, and a model can be built from first
principles. In the black-box setting we have no prior
knowledge about the underlying process, and to our help
is only the statistics generated by the input-output pro-
cess. A gray-box model corresponds to something in be-
tween, when we have partial knowledge about the pro-
cess.
In the circuit model the different black- and non-
black-box models will translate into the following
• The white-box model assumes that we know ev-
erything that we can know about implementation
of the oracle. That is, we know the specific cir-
cuit that performs the function, and even how the
computing machinery is built and operates.
• The black-box model assumes that we know noth-
ing about the implementation of the oracles. We
can only access inputs to and outputs from the cir-
cuit.
• A gray-box is some specified mixture of black and
white, for instance, it could be that we have more
knowledge about how the function is implemented,
but not complete knowledge.
1.3 Quantum Computation
A QTM computer is a machine that operates on quan-
tum bits, or qubits, rather than bits. Qubits are the el-
ementary information carriers in quantum theory. They
are two-level systems that can be parameterized by two
complex numbers a and b through the expression
a |0〉+ b |1〉 , (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the two orthogonal eigenstates to
the Pauli-Z operator,
Z |0〉 = |0〉 , Z |1〉 = − |1〉 . (2)
These states are usually referred to as the computational
basis states.
We will use two kinds of operations on these qubits,
reversible transformations and measurements. Transfor-
mations relate to the classical bit operations and are de-
scribed by unitary operators
AA† = A†A = I, (3)
where (†) is the Hermitian conjugate, and I the iden-
tity operator. These operators are also referred to as
5
quantum gates. Measurements are used to retrieve in-
formation from these systems, and of particular use are
projective measurements. In such a measurement the
state is projected onto an eigenstate of an observable
(a Hermitian operator), and the information retrieved
by an observer from such a measurement is the eigen-
value corresponding to that eigenstate. The probability
of obtaining a specific outcome from a specific observ-
able depends on the state before measurement, and is
given by the Born rule [21]. The probability is given by
the absolute square of the component (amplitude) in the
direction of the eigenstate related to the outcome. As
an example, the probability of finding the qubit repre-
sented by expression (1) in state |0〉, from measuring the
Z observable, is |a|2. Furthermore, the state of the phys-
ical system is changed in a projective measurement to
the eigenstate in question (or a vector in the eigenspace,
in the degenerate case). The state is projected onto the
eigenspace, hence the term projective measurement. The
requirement that the probabilities of the different out-
comes sums to one translates into normalization of the
state so that |ψ|2 = 1.
There exists a third operation: preparation, that can
be thought of as measurement on an unknown state fol-
lowed by a unitary transformation that depends on the
measurement outcome, such that the output eigenstate
is rotated to the desired state. For a more thorough
explanation of the primitives (and their generalizations
that we do not treat here), see Nielsen and Chuang [30].
An important concept in quantum information the-
ory is that of mutually unbiased bases. Take two sets of
states {|ei〉} and {|fj〉}, both being bases for the quan-
tum system. These two bases are said to be mutually
unbiased if any pair of two states formed between the
sets satisfy the condition∣∣ 〈ei|fj〉 ∣∣2 = 1
d
, (4)
where d is the dimension of the system. Importantly,
the left-hand side is constant, independent of bases and
states, so that information retrieved from a projective
measurement along one basis is completely unrelated to
the information retrieved from a projective measurement
in the other basis. [31]
As an example, the bases spanned by the eigenstates
of the Pauli operators X,Y and Z are 2-dimensional and
mutually unbiased.
{|0〉 , |1〉}Z , {|+〉 , |−〉}X , {|+i〉 , |−i〉}Y (5)
A transition between the computational basis and the
phase basis, spanned by the eigenstates of X, can be per-
formed by the Hadamard gate H = H† by
H |0〉 = |+〉 , H |1〉 = |−〉 . (6)
It also transform the Pauli operators according to
HZH = X, HXH = Z, HY H = −Y. (7)
Composition of systems of several qubits uses the ten-
sor product, for example
|ψ〉AB = |φ〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉B = |φ〉A |ϕ〉B , (8)
where the subscripts A and B indicates that the states
describe two subsystems, but these are often dropped
from the notation. The dimension of the tensor product
vector space is the product of the constituent spaces,
and therefore, computations involving n qubits will
have states described by a 2n-dimensional Hilbert space.
States that can be written on the form (8) are called
product states. The tensor product creates a Hilbert
space (here, finite-dimensional complex vector space) of
all linear combinations of the possible separable states.
Some of these linear combinations cannot be written as
a product state as in Equation (8), and these are called
entangled states.
The most well-known two-qubit gate is the quantum
CNOT gate. A CNOT is a controlled-X operation; it
applies X to the target qubit conditioned on the control
qubit. The graphical presentation is a dot on the control
qubit, connected with a control line to the target gate,
here an X. For some examples of gate arrangements, see
Figure 2. With |c〉 as control and |t〉 as target it has the
effect
CNOT |c〉 |t〉 = |c〉 |t⊕ c〉 , (9)
where “⊕” is the exclusive-OR, or addition modulo 2 so
that
|00〉 7→ |00〉
|01〉 7→ |01〉
|10〉 7→ |11〉
|11〉 7→ |10〉 .
(10)
This is the effect as seen from the computational basis.
From the point of view of the phase basis, transforming
the operator via Hadamard transforms, we obtain a dif-
ferent map (see Figure 2A), and it is easy to verify that,
for example
|+−〉 = 12 |00〉+ 12 |01〉+ 12 |10〉 − 12 |11〉
7→ 12 |00〉+ 12 |01〉 − 12 |10〉+ 12 |11〉 = |−−〉 ,
(11)
in total
|++〉 7→ |++〉
|+−〉 7→ |−−〉
|−+〉 7→ |−+〉
|−−〉 7→ |+−〉 ,
(12)
that is,
H⊗2 CNOT H⊗2 |c〉 |t〉 = |c⊕ t〉 |t〉 . (13)
This effect in the phase basis is sometimes called phase
kickback [32].
A controlled phase flip (Controlled-Z or CZ) and
a qubit swap (SWAP), that corresponds to classically
swapping the qubits [33], can also be constructed di-
rectly from the CNOT (see Figure 2A). The CZ and
SWAP behaviors correspond to small modifications of
Equations (10) and (12).
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A.
H H X
≡
H X H
B.
≡
H X H Z
C.
X X
≡
X
Figure 2: Identities for two qubit quantum gates. A.
The effect of a quantum CNOT in the Hadamard basis.
B. relation between CNOT and CZ. C. construction of
a SWAP gate from three CNOT gates.
Toffoli and Fredkin gates are controlled versions of
the CNOT and SWAP, respectively. A Toffoli gives the
map
Toffoli |c〉 |c′〉 |t〉 = |c〉 |c′〉 |t⊕ cc′〉 , (14)
while a Fredkin gives
Fredkin |c〉 |t〉 |t′〉 = |c〉 |t⊕ c(t⊕ t′)〉 |t′ ⊕ c(t⊕ t′)〉 ,
(15)
A Toffoli gate with n controlling qubits is called an n-
Toffoli. Also, inverted (white) controls enables the gate
if the control system is in state |0〉, and can be imple-
mented by applying an X before and after the control.
Since functions in quantum computation are con-
structed from unitary transformations, any function im-
plemented needs to be reversible. The standard approach
is to use the circuit model wherein the computation is
described by a reversible circuit, and then replace the
classical reversible gates by their quantum equivalents.
Then, the circuit constitutes a unitary operation with the
same mapping of the computational basis states as the
classical analogue of a reversible circuit operating on bits.
In contrast to the classical reversible function, there may
be additional information to retrieve from the output of
the query register. There is at least one additional in-
formation carrying degree-of-freedom that we can choose
to retrieve information from, instead of retrieving the re-
sult of the computation. Of course, in classical reversible
logic, we cannot expect to retrieve any additional infor-
mation about the computation from the query register
after such a transformation, see Figure 3.
Input-register
Output-register Function output
Unchanged in
computational basis,
additional information
in phase basis
f
...
...
...
...
Uf
Figure 3: A reversible logical function. In the quantum
case we can choose to retrieve function output or some
additional information from the output of the query reg-
ister.
A quantum oracle is an oracle assumed to be a spe-
cific unitary transformation acting on qubits (or other
quantum systems) rather than on classical bits. (For a
formal definition in the QTM model, see Bennett et al.
[25].) Such an oracle is a unitary transformation, so it
is necessarily a reversible map from qubits to qubits. A
quantum oracle is usually described by a classical re-
versible logical function encoded into the computational
basis of a unitary operator. Having access to such an ora-
cle a quantum computer can exploit the ability to sample
from some distributions related to the function, rather
than just having access to the function itself. This will
be further discussed in Section 5.
2 Quantum Simulation Logic
In what follows we will use Quantum Simulation Logic
(QSL), which extends an earlier model for simulation
of quantum mechanical systems known as Spekkens’ toy
model [13]. That model views the quantum state as a
state of the observer’s knowledge, an epistemic state, rep-
resented as probability distributions over a set of ontic
states, and the ontic state is hidden away from the ob-
server. The word hidden is key here, because the model
restricts the knowledge an observer can have about the
ontic state of the system; the knowledge balance princi-
ple states that the amount of knowledge an observer has
about the system is at most equally large as the amount
of knowledge an observer lacks about the system. This
implies that there is a restriction to the allowed proba-
bility distributions that are used to describe states in the
model.
Spekkens’ model associates the ontic states of a qubit
system with the four points of the corresponding phase
space. QSL indexes these four points using two bits of in-
formation, so that the ontic state is represented through
two classical bits, details will follow below. Since the
main part of the paper is about computation, the words
ontic and epistemic will not be used below, but those
acquainted with Spekkens’ model may find it useful to
remember that the basic bit values in the QSL model
are associated with Spekkens’ ontic states, and a prob-
abilistic combination of different bit-values correspond
to Spekkens’ epistemic states, or indeed, correspond di-
rectly to quantum states of the simulated quantum sys-
tem.
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In this section we will see several examples of how
QSL is similar to quantum theory. Some, but not all,
of these examples can be stated directly in Spekkens’
toy model, and a few are even present in Ref. [13]. We
include these to show how easy it is to follow the time
evolution of a QSL system, protocol, or algorithm, as
compared to the standard representation of Spekkens’
model, and to illustrate and get a feeling of how the
QSL framework works. One should be aware that QSL
extends beyond Spekkens’ toy model (through the Tof-
foli as described below), so some properties of Spekkens’
model do not hold in QSL, but QSL can in turn repro-
duce phenomena not reproducible in Spekkens’ model.
2.1 Elementary Systems
Each elementary QSL system is constructed from two
classical information carriers that each can carry one bit
of information. Yet, preparation and measurement only
allow for storage of one bit of information or retrieval
of one bit of information, while the other is destroyed
through randomization, just as in Spekkens’ model. This
gives the following description.
2.1.1 States
The state of an elementary system is represented by a
tuple
(x0, p0), (16)
where x0 and p0 represent the bit values of the two clas-
sical carriers.
Preparing an elementary system to have a definite
value in the x0 bit corresponds to preparing a quantum
system in the computational basis state |x0〉, an eigen-
state of the Z observable. For this reason, x0 will be
referred to as the computational bit. Since the elemen-
tary system only can carry one bit of information, the
second bit p0 is in this case necessarily described by an
equally weighted random variable R ∈ {0, 1}. In other
words, to simulate the eigenstates of the Z observable
we have
(0, R) ∼ |0〉 , (1, R) ∼ |1〉 . (17)
Similarly, preparing an elementary system to have a def-
inite value of the p0 bit corresponds to preparing a quan-
tum system in a phase basis state,
(R, 0) ∼ |+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
, (R, 1) ∼ |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
.
(18)
These give us a simulation of eigenstates of the X ob-
servable. For this reason, p0 will be referred to as the
phase bit. Also here, the other bit, in this case the com-
putational bit, must be random.
Note that the |1〉 state is associated with x0 = 1 and
the −1 eigenvalue of the Z observable, and similarly, the
|−〉 state is associated with p0 = 1 and the −1 eigen-
value of the X observable. In what follows, the X ob-
servable will be used interchangeably with the projection
(I −X)/2 = |−〉 〈−|, differing only in eigenvalues while
retaining eigenvectors.
This brings us to the first analogy with quantum
theory, namely the uncertainty principle. An observer
cannot simultaneously make a value assignment to the
complementary observables X and Z, and having per-
fect knowledge about one implies having none about the
other. This is true in both QSL and in quantum theory.
The information can also be stored in the correlation
between the computational bit and phase bit. They are
then either correlated or anti-correlated, and this simu-
lates the eigenstates of the Y observable.
(R,R) ∼ |0〉+ i |1〉√
2
, (R,R⊕ 1) ∼ |0〉 − i |1〉√
2
(19)
Also here, each value of the bit XOR is associated with
the eigenspaces of the (I − Y )/2 observable.
These six are all the pure qubit states that we can
simulate with a single elementary QSL-system. In addi-
tion, we can represent the maximally mixed state that
encodes that we have no knowledge at all about the sys-
tem. The natural way to do that is to have both the
computational and phase bit represented by two inde-
pendent random variables.
(Rx, Rp) ∼ I2 (20)
These seven QSL states are equivalent to Spekkens’ epis-
temic states [13]: the six pure states, and the maximally
mixed state.
An elementary QSL system has a sample space of four
discrete points, corresponding to the four ontic states in
Spekkens’ model (the description with the four boxes
 appears in [13]),
(x0, p0) = 0 1 2 3 ∼ |ψ〉
(0, R) =  ∼ |0〉
(1, R) =  ∼ |1〉
(R, 0) =  ∼ |+〉
(R, 1) =  ∼ |−〉
(R,R⊕ 1) =  ∼ |+i〉
(R,R) =  ∼ |−i〉
(Rx, Rp) =  ∼ I2 ,
(21)
and with p0 as the least significant bit (LSB) they have
the canonical labeling
(x0, p0) = 0 1 2 3
(0, 0) = 0
(0, 1) = 1
(1, 0) = 2
(1, 1) = 3.
(22)
Perhaps the most used method of calculating the sim-
ilarity between two quantum states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 is the
absolute square of their inner product, | 〈ψ|φ〉 |2. This is
called the statistical overlap or transition probability [34],
and take on values between 0 and 1. If the states are
parallel, then | 〈ψ|φ〉 |2 = 1, and if they are orthogonal
| 〈ψ|φ〉 |2 = 0.
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In QSL this quantity is the standard statistical over-
lap, or the complement of the Kolmogorov distance
F 2(P,Q) = 1− δ(P,Q) = 1− 12
∑
x∈Ω
|P (x)−Q(x)|, (23)
where P and Q are distributions describing the states.
States with disjoint support are perfectly distinguishable
in the same way as orthogonal states are perfectly dis-
tinguishable, while states with overlapping support are
not.
Another popular measure of similarity is the fidelity,
which in QSL is given as the square root of the statistical
overlap,
F (P,Q) =
√
1− δ(P,Q). (24)
The quantum fidelity between two mixed states ρ and σ
is given for general states by
F (ρ, σ) = Tr(
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2), (25)
where Tr denotes the trace of the operator. If ρ is pure
this simplifies to
√〈ρ|σ|ρ〉, and if both states are pure to
| 〈ρ|σ〉 | (see [35]). For an elementary system the fidelity
between QSL states is completely equivalent with that
between quantum states. As an example, the fidelity be-
tween (0, R) and (0, R′) is 1, between (0, R) and (1, R′)
is 0, and between (0, R) and any other state is 1/
√
2
(including the maximally mixed).
Note that the fidelity measure in QSL is not the Bhat-
tacharyya coefficient
B(P,Q) =
∑
x∈Ω
√
P (x)Q(x) (26)
that is usually taken as the classical analogue to quan-
tum fidelity [36].
The quantum states of a qubit have a geometrical
representation called the Bloch sphere. It is a unit ball
where all pairs of antipodal points on the surface corre-
spond to orthogonal pure states, and inside the surface
resides the mixed states.
(0, R)
(1, R)
(R, 0)
(R, 1)
(R,R)
(R,R⊕ 1) (Rx, Rp)
Figure 4: Geometric representation of the seven states
of an elementary QSL system and their position relative
to the Bloch sphere.
The QSL states in relation to the Bloch sphere is shown
on Figure 4. Their positions are motivated by the re-
lations of Equations (17) to (19) to mutually unbiased
pairs of orthogonal quantum states. The states in each
pair have disjoint support, and each state has a statistical
overlap F 2 = 1/2 with any state in any other pair; they
form mutually unbiased partitions of the state space.
2.1.2 Transformations
Unitary transformations are reversible maps on quan-
tum states. It is therefore natural to simulate these with
operations from classical reversible logic on the bits com-
posing a QSL state.
In identifying which transformations that correspond
to which quantum gates, we start with the X transfor-
mation. This operation inverts the states of the compu-
tational basis and leaves the phase basis unchanged.
X |0〉 = |1〉 , X |1〉 = |0〉 , X |±〉 = |±〉 (27)
Therefore the corresponding QSL gate flips the compu-
tational bit and leaves the phase bit unchanged (see Fig-
ure 5),
X (x0, p0) = (x0 ⊕ 1, p0) (28)
or as the permutation (02)(13) in the cyclic notation.
In the same way, the Z gate inverts the phase basis
and leaves the computational basis unchanged.
Z |0〉 = |0〉 , Z |1〉 = |1〉 , Z |±〉 = |∓〉 . (29)
Hence, the QSL Z-gate flips the phase bit instead of the
computational bit
Z(x0, p0) = (x0, p0 ⊕ 1) (30)
or (01)(23).
In QSL the states that correspond to eigenstates of
Y can be singled out as those that preserve the parity
between the computational and phase bit, x0 ⊕ p0. The
only way a transformation will preserve that while also
inverting the computational and phase basis, is to flip
both bits.
Y(x0, p0) = (x0 ⊕ 1, p0 ⊕ 1) (31)
This corresponds to the permutation (03)(12). Figure 5
shows a graphical representation of these transforma-
tions. Blue line segments represent the computational
bit and red represents the phase bit.
As in quantum theory these transformations uphold
the identities
X 2 = Y2 = Z2 = I, (32)
but composition of these gates also shows a difference
between QSL and quantum theory. The identity
XZ = −iY (33)
is not upheld, but instead
XZ = Y. (34)
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∼X ∼
Y ∼
Z ∼
Figure 5: Graphical representation of the simulation of
the Pauli gates I,X, Y and Z. Blue line segments repre-
sent the computational bit and red represents the phase
bit.
Another useful transformation is the Hadamard gate.
This quantum gate obeys
HZH = X, and HXH = Z (35)
while also being an involution, H2 = I. In QSL the
mapping that simulates this is the one that swaps the
computational and phase bit.
H(x0, p0) = (p0, x0). (36)
This permutation, which in cyclic notation is given by
(12), is identified as the analogue of the Hadamard gate
in [37], and indeed,
H2 = I, HZH = X , and HXH = Z. (37)
Note that the analogy is not complete, because in quan-
tum theory we have
HYH = −Y, (38)
while in QSL
HYH = Y. (39)
The last single qubit gate that we describe is the S-
gate. This is the square root of the Z-gate,
S2 = Z, (40)
which has an order of four. By defining it as
S(x0, p0) = (x0 ⊕ 1, p0 ⊕ x0), (41)
which is equivalent with the permutation (0213), and
with
S−1(x0, p0) = (x0 ⊕ 1, p0 ⊕ x0 ⊕ 1), (42)
we see that Equation (40) and the quantum identities
SXS† = Y and SZS† = Z (43)
are obeyed since
S2 = Z, SXS−1 = Y, and SZS−1 = Z, (44)
but again, while we expect
SY S† = −X (45)
QSL instead gives
SYS−1 = X . (46)
Figure 6 shows a graphical representation of the simula-
tion of the Hadamard, S, and S† gates.
H ∼
S ∼
S† ∼
Figure 6: Graphical representation for the simulation
of Hadamard, S, and S† gates.
All of these transformations are generated by H
and S (Z = S2, X = HZH, Y = XZ, S−1 = XSX ),
which also generate the group of transformations that
Spekkens allows for in his model, the symmetric group
on four symbols S4 [38, p. 68]. This is because S gives the
4-cycle (0213) and H gives the 2-cycle (12) of adjacent
elements in that 4-cycle.
Another way to view this [13] is through the Bloch
representation. Figure 7 shows the effect of X , Z, H,
and S, on the six QSL states.
A zˆ
xˆ
yˆ
B zˆ
xˆ
yˆ
C zˆ
xˆ
yˆ
D zˆ
xˆ
yˆ
Figure 7: Effect of the transformations on the six QSL
states in the Bloch representation. A-D shows the X ,
Z, H, and S gates respectively.
We can see that the X and Z transformations have the
expected effect, considering that in the Bloch sphere
representation they can be viewed as 180◦ rotations
around the xˆ and zˆ directions respectively (see Figure 7A
and Figure 7B). However, the expected effect of the
Hadamard gate is to also flip the states along yˆ, but
this is not the case in QSL (see Figure 7C). Finally, the
quantum S-gate correspond to a 90◦ plane rotation of
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the Bloch sphere, while the QSL simulation also flips the
states along zˆ (see Figure 7C).
Spekkens recognizes this and shows that some trans-
formations, like those we relate to H and S gates, cor-
respond to antiunitary maps in the Bloch sphere repre-
sentation. Skotiniotis et al. [39] connected the subgroup
of 12 even permutations A4 to unitary maps, while the
odd permutations correspond to antiunitary maps.
It is surprising that these faulty identities, or sys-
tematic errors, exist at the level of simulating qubits,
but that the simulation can reproduce many phenomena
even when the system size grows. There will be many
examples of this in the rest of this paper.
2.1.3 No Universal Spin-1/2 Inverter
A universal state inverter is a transformation that takes
an arbitrary state ρ and produces an orthogonal state ρ⊥.
Such a device is not allowed by quantum theory [40].
For a pure qubit state the operation inverting the spin is
given by a composition ofX, Z, and complex conjugation∣∣ψ⊥〉 = XZ |ψ∗〉 [41]. Here |ψ∗〉 represents the complex
conjugated state. In the Bloch sphere representation the
spin flip operation is such that
ρ = I + ~r ~σ2 7→ ρ
⊥ = I − ~r ~σ2 , (47)
where ~r is the Bloch vector and ~σ = Xxˆ + Y yˆ + Zzˆ is
the Pauli vector. In general
ρ⊥ = XZρ∗ZX, (48)
where Z flips the sign of the xˆ-component in the Bloch
vector, X flips the sign of the zˆ-component, and con-
jugation flips the sign of the yˆ-component. This is an
anti-unitary map and cannot be implemented with the
dynamics of a quantum system.
In QSL, because of the existence of transformations
that correspond to anti-unitary maps in the Bloch sphere
representation, one may be tempted to think that a uni-
versal spin-1/2 inverter could be possible. This is not the
case, because a device that takes an arbitrary QSL state
and produces the disjoint state must obey the following
three conditions.
1. Map the eigenstates of X to each other. This is
done by flipping the phase bit while doing nothing
to the computational bit.
2. Map the eigenstates of Z to each other. This is
done by flipping the computational bit while doing
nothing to the phase bit.
3. Map the eigenstates of Y to each other. This re-
quires changing the parity between the computa-
tional and phase bit.
The third condition cannot be obeyed without violating
the other two.
2.1.4 Measurement
A measurement in QSL consists of information retrieval
followed by a state update to ensure that only one bit of
information can be known about an elementary system.
This is completely equivalent to Spekkens’ model, and
simulates measurement disturbance, or the update of a
quantum state after a measurement (sometimes called
collapse). The specifics are as follows.
A projective measurement of Z in QSL returns the
computational bit and randomizes the phase bit, while
measuring the X observable instead reads the phase bit
and randomizes the computational bit. Remember that
the phase-bit value 0 is associated with a positive rel-
ative phase between the computational states, and the
phase-bit value 1 is associated with a negative relative
phase. Finally, measuring Y returns the parity of the
computational and phase bit and then randomizes both
the computational and phase bits while preserving par-
ity, that is, if measuring Y yields x0 ⊕ p0 = 0, then the
system is updated randomly to either (0, 0) or (1, 1), and
if x0⊕ p0 = 1, the system is updated randomly to either
(0, 1) or (1, 0).
This ensures repeatability of measurements, i.e., if a
projective measurement is repeated, the second measure-
ment will yield the same outcome as the first. It also
ensures measurement disturbance, prohibiting that the
bit values not measured can be predicted after the mea-
surement. The connection with mutual unbiasedness is
clear. Information retrieved from one of these measure-
ments is unrelated to the information retrieved from the
other. That is, we can retrieve either the computational
bit, the phase bit, or the parity between them, never two
of them, or indeed three.
2.1.5 Preparation
To prepare a system that simulates |0〉 or |1〉, we create
a system with the computational bit x0 = 0 or x0 = 1
respectively, and the phase bit is chosen randomly. In
the same way we can prepare QSL states simulating
|+〉 , |−〉 , |+i〉 and |−j〉 by distributing p0 and x0 accord-
ing to the respective distribution.
Preparation by measurement can also be performed,
by taking a maximally mixed state (the state of no
knowledge, with both computational and the phase bit
randomized), measuring some observable to obtain in-
formation on the state, and then transforming the now
known state into the desired state.
2.1.6 Non-commutativity of Measurements
In quantum theory the order of measurements performed
is of importance to their outcomes. Consider for instance
that we have prepared a quantum state |0〉 and then we
measure the observables X and Z. If Z is measured first
it will produce the outcome 0 with certainty, and then X
will randomly yield the outcome 0 (for |+〉) or 1 (for |−〉)
with equal probability. If the order of the measurements
is reversed, both measurements of X and Z will instead
produce independent random outcomes.
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In QSL the outcomes are, for this particular proto-
col, in complete compliance with quantum theory. To
simulate the above procedure we start by preparing the
QSL state
(0, R). (49)
Measuring Z will return the computational bit which will
always be 0, and randomize the already random phase
bit, so that the state changes from (0, R) to (0, R′). Mea-
surement of X will then return the new random value R′
of the phase bit and randomize the computational bit. If
we instead start by measuring X the outcome will be the
random value R while the computational bit is random-
ized so that the state changes from (0, R) to (R′′, R). A
subsequent measurement of Z will retrieve R′′.
2.1.7 QKD — BB84
Having built up the model for simulating single qubit sys-
tems, let us now consider a cryptographic protocol that
only requires a single qubit system. In 1984, Bennett
and Brassard [42] presented a protocol for distributing a
cryptographic key, with the property that an eavesdrop-
per can in principle be detected, and then the compro-
mised key can be discarded.
The protocol is shown in Figure 8 and proceeds as
follows. In one round of the protocol Alice wants to send
a random bit b to Bob. Alice encodes this bit in a one
of two bases, {|0〉,|1〉} or {|+〉,|−〉}. The bit-value b = 0
is encoded in either |0〉 or |+〉, and b = 1 into |1〉 or |−〉.
Alice chooses the encoding randomly, and Bob chooses to
perform a measurement in one of these two bases, also
randomly. If Bob chooses the same encoding as Alice,
then he receives the bit b, otherwise he retrieves 0 or 1
with equal probability.
Alice’s encoding Bob’s encoding
Eve
|b〉 H H
Figure 8: The BB84 protocol with an eavesdropper
present.
This procedure is now repeated a number of times,
and after a sufficiently long sequence they stop and share
the encoding they used. Both Alice and Bob can now de-
duce in which rounds of the protocol their encoding were
different, and discard data from these rounds. This pro-
cess is known as sifting. The remaining data of Alice is
now equal to that of Bob (in the ideal case); they each
have a copy of the same random bit-string.
If someone (usually denoted Eve) is trying to eaves-
drop during this process, the measurement disturbance
will introduce noise in the key. Eve is assumed to have no
knowledge about the random encoding used by Alice, so
Eve’s best strategy is to guess the encoding at random.
If Eve’s guess is correct, the quantum state is unaffected
by her measurement, but if Eve’s guess is wrong, she only
gets random data and her measurement device outputs
a state in the wrong basis. For example, if Alice sends
the state |0〉, and Eve picks the phase basis {|+〉 , |−〉},
then Eve’s measurement outcome e is random, and her
measurement will update the quantum state into
|0〉+ (−1)e |1〉√
2
. (50)
When Bob then measures in the computational basis
there is a 50% chance of creating a bit-error in the key.
An eavesdropper can now be detected if Alice and
Bob sacrifice part of the key and compare it between
themselves. If the error rate is too high (nonzero in the
ideal case), the whole key should be discarded because
Eve has been eavesdropping. If the error rate is suffi-
ciently low (zero in the ideal case), they can be confident
that no one have listened in on their communication.
In a real system with noise and lost qubits this is more
complicated, and there are also ways to handle limited
eavesdropping, but here we will restrict ourselves to the
ideal case.
The simulation of the protocol in QSL can be ex-
emplified as follows. If Alice chooses the computational
basis state, her bit b is encoded into the QSL state
(b, R). (51)
If she instead chooses the phase basis, her bit b is encoded
in the QSL state
(R, b). (52)
If Bob chooses to measure in the same basis as Alice has
used for encoding, he will retrieve the bit b, otherwise
he will retrieve the random value R, which will then be
discarded in the sifting step.
If Eve is eavesdropping, there is a 50% chance that
she chooses a different encoding than Alice, in which case
she retrieves the random value R, and through the mea-
surement disturbance mechanism, she also randomizes
the bit-value b. In this case Bob will receive a random bit
value (independent of b), irrespective of in which encod-
ing he measures. This reproduces the quantum behavior
of BB84. In other words, the BB84 protocol including
the described attack, known as the intercept-resend at-
tack, can be faithfully simulated in QSL.
It is important to note that the security fails if there
exists a measurement that retrieves information with-
out disturbing the system. In QSL we have included a
restriction on the allowed measurements in order to sim-
ulate measurement disturbance. In an actual implemen-
tation of QSL, using physical bits, this restriction could
be ignored by an adversary, and a measurement that
does not disturb the system be performed. In quantum
theory there is no such measurement [43], but if an ac-
tual implementation of BB84 does not use an ideal qubit
there may be such a measurement. A well-known ex-
ample is when failing to make a single-photon source so
that in each round, the information is encoded onto sev-
eral photons. In this case, an eavesdropper could split
off two of the many photons, and measure separately on
them, in the two possible encodings. This would reveal
the information present in one of the encodings (Eve will
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learn which is correct in the sifting phase), while not dis-
turbing the remaining photons at all, so that no noise is
present in the generated key. This attack, known as the
photon-number-splitting attack, would be equivalent to
an adversary ignoring the restriction of QSL.
2.2 Pairs of Elementary Systems
In this section we are at most considering pairs of qubits,
i.e., 2× 2 dimensional systems.
QSL-systems compose under the Cartesian product,
and for two elementary systems we write
(x1, p1)× (x0, p0) = (x1, p1) (x0, p0), (53)
the latter notation for brevity, which we could equiva-
lently write
(x, p) = (2x1 + x0, 2p1 + p0) (54)
so that x and p can take the values {0, 1, 2, 3}. This
gives a pair of QSL-systems a sample space of 16 dis-
crete points.
States that cannot be described as convex combina-
tions of other states corresponds to pure states, and the
maximally mixed state is still represented by a uniform
distribution over all 16 points.
2.2.1 Transformations
For pairs of elementary systems we also have gates cor-
responding to two-qubit gates. The relations in Figure 2
motivates the following construction of a QSL analogue
of the quantum CNOT, and one can verify that this con-
struction is equivalent with the construction in [13].
CNOT (x1, p1) (x0, p0) = (x1, p1⊕p0) (x0⊕x1, p0), (55)
see Figure 9A for a graphical representation.
A.
X
∼
B.
Z
∼
C.
∼
Figure 9: Graphical representation of the QSL analogue
of two qubit quantum gates. A. CNOT, B. controlled-Z,
and C. SWAP, all constructed to uphold the identities
in Figure 2.
Controlled-Z (CZ) and SWAP follow directly from
the identities
CZ = (I ⊗H)CNOT (I ⊗H) (56)
SWAP = CNOT (H ⊗H)CNOT (H ⊗H)CNOT (57)
(see Figure 9B,C). This implies the QSL maps
CZ(x1, p1) (x0, p0) = (x1, p1 ⊕ x0) (x0, p0 ⊕ x1) (58)
and
SWAP(x1, p1) (x0, p0) = (x0, p0) (x1, p1). (59)
2.2.2 Entanglement
The QSL analogue to product states are states where the
information about one subsystem is independent of the
information about the other subsystem. In contrast, in
entangled states the information is stored in the correla-
tions between the pair of QSL-systems.
In quantum theory, a measure of the amount of entan-
glement in a bipartite system is the entropy of entangle-
ment. This is obtained by calculating the von Neumann
entropy of the reduced density operator ρA = trB(ρAB),
where ρAB is the state of the composite system A ⊗ B,
and trB is the partial trace taken over the subspace re-
lated to system B. As an example, consider the Bell
state 1/
√
2(|01〉+ |10〉) with density operator
ρ = |01〉〈01|+ |01〉〈10|+ |10〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|2 . (60)
The reduced density operator for system A is the maxi-
mally mixed state,
ρA =
|0〉〈0| 〈1|1〉+ |0〉〈1| 〈1|0〉+ |1〉〈0| 〈0|1〉+ |1〉〈1| 〈0|0〉
2
= |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|2 =
I
2 .
(61)
This makes the entropy of entanglement equal to 1,
and means that even though we have a pure bipartite
state (of entropy 0) we obtain a maximally mixed state
(of entropy 1) for the subsystem A. The entropy of en-
tanglement is symmetric in its arguments, so the un-
certainty about the state of subsystem A equals that of
subsystem B, S(ρA) = S(ρB). So we have maximal in-
formation about the whole system but no information
about the individual parts. Thus, in a sense all informa-
tion is stored in the correlations of the pair. States with
this property are called maximally entangled. The Bell
states∣∣Ψ±〉 = |00〉 ± |11〉√
2
and
∣∣Φ±〉 = |01〉 ± |10〉√
2
, (62)
are maximally entangled states. These can be generated
from the following recipe (see Figure 10).
1. Prepare a pair of qubits in the state |a〉 |b〉, where
ab is 00 for |Ψ+〉, 01 for |Φ+〉, 10 for |Ψ−〉, and 11
for |Φ−〉.
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2. Apply a Hadamard gate to the first qubit.
3. Apply a CNOT with the first qubit as control and
the second as target.
|Φ±〉 or |Ψ±〉
|a〉 H
|b〉 X
Figure 10: Circuit for generating the four Bell states.
We can use this recipe also in QSL to produce the states
simulating the Bell states in Equation (62). As an ex-
ample, the state simulating Φ+ is
(0, R) (1, R′) H×I−−−→ (R, 0) (1, R′)
CNOT−−−−→ (R,R′) (R,R′).
(63)
For the whole state there are 2 bits of uncertainty, and is
therefore a state of maximal knowledge since it is com-
posed by two elementary subsystems. Viewing one of the
individual subsystems, and ignoring the other, there is
also two bits of uncertainty and therefore, viewed indi-
vidually, they are maximally mixed.
The four QSL states related to Bell states are∣∣Ψ+〉 ∼ (R,R′) (R,R′)∣∣Ψ−〉 ∼ (R,R′) (R,R′)∣∣Φ+〉 ∼ (R,R′) (R,R′)∣∣Φ−〉 ∼ (R,R′) (R,R′),
(64)
where R and R′ are independent randomly generated
bits. These states are equivalent with those used by
Spekkens, but represented differently. Spekkens repre-
sents the state of a pair of elementary systems by their
joint probability distribution. As an example,




(65)
shows the joint probability distribution corresponding to
|Ψ+〉. The marginal probability distributions for each el-
ementary system are uniform, corresponding to a maxi-
mally mixed states; in their marginal distributions there
is no information about the state.
2.2.3 Remote Steering
Suppose that Alice and Bob each possess one qubit of a
pair in the state
|00〉+ |11〉√
2
= |++〉+ |−−〉√
2
. (66)
This is sometimes expressed as Alice and Bob sharing an
entangled state. If Bob measures his qubit in the com-
putational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, then he obtains the outcome
for |0〉 and |1〉 with equal probability. If he obtains |0〉,
the state updates according to
|00〉+ |11〉√
2
→ |00〉 (67)
and if he gets |1〉 it updates according to
|00〉+ |11〉√
2
→ |11〉 . (68)
In both cases he knows the state of Alice’s qubit, but
if Bob instead chooses to measure in the phase basis, he
will still get outcomes for {|+〉 , |−〉} at random and with
equal probability. If the outcome is |+〉 or |−〉 the state
updates to
|00〉+ |11〉√
2
→ |++〉 or |00〉+ |11〉√
2
→ |−−〉 (69)
respectively. In either case Bob will learn the state of
Alice’s system, but he also notes that it will be differ-
ent if he chose to measure in the computational or phase
basis. This phenomenon, that Bob apparently can influ-
ence Alice’s state by the choice of his measurement basis,
is known as remote steering.
In QSL this is simulated as follows. Alice and Bob
each get one elementary system from a pair initiated in
the state ∣∣Ψ+〉 ∼ (R,R′) (R,R′). (70)
If Bob measures Z, he learns the value of R, and thus
also the value of the computational bit in Alice’s system.
If R was 1 (there is a 50% probability of that being the
case) the state updates to
(1, R′′) (1, R′), (71)
and accordingly if the outcome is 0, here R′′ is a new i.i.d
random bit generated by the measurement. Note that
this also terminates the last bit of correlation between
the two systems so that there is no correlation between
them after the measurement. If Bob instead measures
X , he learns the value of R′, and thus the value of the
phase bit in Alice’s system. If the outcome is 1 the state
updates to
(R′′, 1) (R, 1). (72)
and accordingly if the outcome is 0. In QSL, and in
Spekkens’ model, the measurement choice of Bob is not
influencing Alice’s system — the measurement choice is
influencing Bob’s knowledge about Alice’s system.
2.2.4 Anti-correlation in Spin-measurements of
the Singlet
Another closely related example that instead does not
work in Spekkens’ model or QSL is complete anticorre-
lation within the singlet. If a single system spin measure-
ment is preformed in any direction, ~r ~σ, on both qubits
in the singlet state
∣∣Φ−〉 = |01〉 − |10〉√
2
, (73)
they will always output opposite values. The state sim-
ulating the singlet is
(R,R′) (R,R′), (74)
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where the overline denotes the Boolean complement. We
can see that measuring Z,X and Y on both systems will
return
R and R
R′ and R′
R⊕R′ and R⊕R′
(75)
respectively. The first two measurements Z and X will
produce opposite outcomes, but the last, Y, will pro-
duce equal outcomes (see the last line of expression (75)).
Thus, even though we are restricted to only three mea-
surements, QSL does not reproduce this phenomenon.
There are three more examples like this; one for each
Bell state, with different relations between the correla-
tions that can be seen from measurements of X, Y and
Z on both qubits. In QSL and Spekkens’ however, mea-
surement of Y will always show opposite correlations as
those in quantum theory, just as in the above example
(see further [13]).
2.2.5 No-cloning
No-cloning is the no-go theorem stating that there is no
unitary transformation that takes an arbitrary state |ψ〉
and an auxiliary qubit |a〉, and returns both systems in
the state |ψ〉 [44]
|ψ〉 |a〉 U9 |ψ〉 |ψ〉 . (76)
A unitary transformation preserves the inner product, so
if we take two quantum states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 and apply a
hypothetical cloner,
|ψ〉 |a〉 → |ψ〉 |ψ〉
|ψ′〉 |a〉 → |ψ′〉 |ψ′〉 . (77)
Requiring the inner product to be preserved we have
〈ψ|ψ′〉 〈a|a〉 = (〈ψ|ψ′〉)2. (78)
Since 〈a|a〉 = 1 this implies that the norm of these two
scalars is equal,
| 〈ψ|ψ′〉 | = | 〈ψ|ψ′〉 |2, (79)
which only happens if the states are parallel or orthogo-
nal. Therefore, there is no single unitary that performs
the task for an arbitrary state.
In QSL we have two elementary systems in pure
states T,W , and an auxiliary system in a pure state A.
The transformation that clones these states is
T ×A 7→ T × T
W ×A 7→W ×W. (80)
For this to be reversible, the number of elements
in the joint support of T × A and W × A needs to be
preserved by the transformation, because if the support
grows or shrinks it is not a bijection. Before the trans-
formation, the number of elements in the joint support
is
|S(T ×A) ∪ S(W ×A)|
= |S(T ×A)|+ |S(W ×A)| − |S(T ×A ∩W ×A)|
= |S(T )||S(A)|+ |S(W )||S(A)| − |S(T ×A ∩W ×A)|
= 8− |S(T ×A ∩W ×A)|
= 8− |S((T ∩W )×A)|
= 8− |S(T ∩W )||S(A)|
= 8− 2|S(T ∩W )|,
(81)
where we have used that the support of a pure state has
2 elements, i.e., |S(A)| = 2. The number of elements in
the joint support after the transformation is
|S(T × T ) ∪ S(W ×W )|
= |S(T × T )|+ |S(W ×W )| − |S(T × T ∩W ×W )|
= |S(T )|2 + |S(W )|2 − |S(T × T ∩W ×W )|
= 8− |S(T × T ∩W ×W )|
= 8− |S(T ∩W × T ∩W )|
= 8− |S(T ∩W )||S(T ∩W )|.
(82)
This gives us the condition (compare with Equation (79))
2|S(T ∩W )| = |S(T ∩W )|2, (83)
but this is only fulfilled when T and W are disjoint (or-
thogonal) or completely overlap (parallel). Therefore, in
a setup with two QSL systems, there is no single QSL
transformation that performs the task for an arbitrary
state.
2.2.6 Interference
Examples of interference does not require a bipartite sys-
tem, but it makes for a good example of how it is used
in quantum information processing.
|0〉 H H
|1〉 H
Uf
Figure 11: Circuit for the Deutsch algorithm used to
illustrate interference.
Consider the protocol in Figure 11. Prepare a two qubit
system in the state |01〉, and apply a Hadamard gate to
each of them
|01〉 H⊗H−−−−→ |0〉 (|0〉 − |1〉) + |1〉 (|0〉 − |1〉)2 . (84)
Then a unitary operation that encodes a reversible func-
tion in the computational basis is applied.
|0〉
(
|f(0)〉 − ∣∣f(0)〉)+ |1〉( |f(1)〉 − ∣∣f(1)〉)
2 . (85)
Even though the unitary encoding the function is used
only once, information about more than a single function
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values (in this case two) appears in the state. This phe-
nomenon is sometimes called quantum parallelism. The
state in expression (85) also equates to
(−1)f(0) |0〉 |−〉+ (−1)f(1) |1〉 |−〉√
2
, (86)
and after the final Hadamard it becomes
(−1)f(0) |+〉 |−〉+ (−1)f(1) |−〉 |−〉√
2
. (87)
Measuring the observable |0〉〈0| ⊗ I, that is, testing
whether the first qubit is still in the initial state |0〉,
will test positive with probability∣∣∣∣ (−1)f(0) + (−1)f(1)2
∣∣∣∣2 . (88)
So, if f(0) 6= f(1) amplitudes will interfere destructively,
and the test will be positive with probability zero. If
f(0) = f(1) they interfere constructively, and the test
will be positive with unit probability. This is known
as Deutsch algorithm [9], and considered by many the
starting point of quantum algorithm research.
There are four functions over 1 bit: f(x) = 0, 1, x,
and x⊕ 1. The canonical way of constructing those with
reversible logic follows. The first two, f(x) = 0 and
f(x) = 1, are constructed by doing nothing at all respec-
tively applying a NOT gate to the output. For the last
two, f(x) = x and f(x) = x ⊕ 1, an additional CNOT
is applied between the input and output. The quantum
unitary Uf would then be realized in four ways, as the
identity, an X gate on the second qubit only, a CNOT,
or a CNOT followed by an X gate on the second qubit.
In QSL, the protocol proceeds as follows. Prepare two
systems simulating |01〉, and apply H to each system
(0, R) (1, R′) H×H−−−→ (R, 0) (R′, 1). (89)
The effect of the above discussed construction of Uf in
QSL will map the function from the first to the sec-
ond system over the computational bits. It will also
add the phase of the second system into the first sys-
tem if the CNOT is present (that is, if f(0) ⊕ f(1) =
1). This simulates the phenomenon sometimes called
phase kickback [32]. For the other two functions (when
f(0)⊕f(1) = 0) there will be no phase kickback. So, not
knowing which function that is implemented, the natural
way of describing the effect of the phase kickback is to
use the parity of the function. This gives the map
(x, p) (y, z) 7→ (x, p⊕z(f(0)⊕f(1) )) (y⊕f(x), z). (90)
Applying the function to the result of the map in expres-
sion (89) we get
(R, 0) (R′, 1) Uf−−→ (R, f(0)⊕ f(1)) (R′ ⊕ f(R), 1), (91)
and then applying the last transformation H⊗ I gives(
f(0)⊕ f(1), R) (R′ ⊕ f(R), 1). (92)
A simulation of measuring the observable |0〉〈0| ⊗ I is to
test whether the computational bit of the first system
is zero or not. From the state in expression (92) this
translates to testing
f(0)⊕ f(1) ?= 0, (93)
which is true only when f(0) and f(1) are equal, and
false when they are not, just as in quantum theory.
0 1
1
Figure 12: Example of QSL simulating interference in
Deutsch algorithm when f(x) = x.
Figure 12 shows the explicit instance of protocol in QSL
when f(x) = x.
This is a faithful simulation of a protocol showing in-
terference and quantum parallelism. Even in QSL there
is an apparent effect of information from both function
values being added to the result, while only one query
is made (see the QSL map Uf in Equation (90) ). Now,
whether a quantum computer access all function values
with only one query, or whether the equations only de-
scribe the structure of additional information that can
be retrieved, is an unsettled philosophical debate. For
QSL the latter is certainly the case, but we should also
stress that QSL is not quantum theory. Yet, since one
process faithfully simulates the other, these processes are
operationally equivalent, and in that spirit a machinery
running this particular QSL recipe should not be distin-
guished from one running the quantum recipe.
We need to stress that in QSL we do not calculate
the parity of the function f(0) ⊕ f(1) by accessing the
function twice, and then have the oracle signal that infor-
mation. The expression using the parity of the function
just turns out to be a good description for the additional
information available when we do not know which of the
four functions that was applied. With the constructions
of f(x) = x and f(x) = x ⊕ 1, the phase bit of the
first system is flipped, but not for the constructions for
f(x) = 0 and f(x) = 1, i.e., the output depends on the
choice of function made in the construction.
To further clarify, with “operationally equivalent” we
mean that processes, or theories are equivalent when only
judged by their input/output behavior. So, a machine
running Deutsch algorithm in QSL is operationally
equivalent to the corresponding process on a quantum
machine, but comparing QSL as a theory against quan-
tum theory is not. In fact, we have already seen ex-
amples that QSL is operationally different, for instance
in the correlations seen in the outcomes from Pauli mea-
surement over Bell states. However, our main goal here is
not to fuel the philosophical debate, nor to perfectly sim-
ulate the whole of quantum theory, but only to simulate
it accurate enough to solve the computational problem.
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2.2.7 Measurements
For one elementary system we have defined three mea-
surements that we relate to the Pauli observables. We
also have six observables for the orthogonal projections
onto their eigenstates, as exemplified in the previous sec-
tion, and we can ask whether the computational bit is
0 or not (corresponding to the observable |0〉〈0|), rather
than asking if it is 0 or 1 (Corresponding to the observ-
able Z). When measuring a single elementary system
there is no distinction between asking if it is 0 or not, or
0 or 1, but for higher dimensional systems there is a dis-
tinction. For instance, say that the dimension is four and
that we measure the observable |0〉〈0|, with the outcome
that the system is not in |0〉, we cannot infer whether it
is |1〉, |2〉, or |3〉. In QSL a measurement of |0〉〈0| cor-
responds to asking the system if all the computational
bits are zero or not. A measurement that distinguishes
between |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, or |3〉 corresponds to asking the sys-
tem whether the computational bits encode 0, 1, 2, or 3
respectively.
For systems composed of two elementary systems, we
have seen that single system measurements act locally.
In the Pauli group of observables there are also joint
measurements of the kind σi ⊗ σj , and in QSL these are
simulated as follows.
A measurement of the Z × Z observable returns the
correlation between the computational bits of both sys-
tems, x1 ⊕ x0, and redistributes according to the out-
come. That is, if x1 ⊕ x0 = 0 the computational bits of
both systems will be random but completely correlated
after the measurement, and if x1 ⊕ x0 = 1 they will be
random but anti-correlated. A measurement represented
by X × X does the same, but for the phase bits. The pro-
cedure is similar for Z × X , for the computational bit of
the first system and with the phase bit of the second,
and so on.
These joint measurements retrieve 1 bit of informa-
tion even though the whole system is composed of two
elementary systems, and we should therefore be able to
retrieve two bits, implying that the joint measurements
are non-maximally informative measurements. In quan-
tum theory this relates to when an observable has degen-
erate eigenvalues. For instance, the observable quantity
X⊗X can take on two different values, and knowing this
value gives us 1 bit of information.
A Bell state measurement is a measurement that dis-
tinguish the four Bell states. This is a maximally infor-
mative measurement since it takes the maximally mixed
state into a pure state (one of the Bell states). In QSL,
an analogue to this measurement returns the correla-
tion between the two computational bits and between
the two phase bits. An example of this will be given in
Section 2.2.8.
This is not to be confused with measurements whose
outcome violate Bell inequalities — measurements in-
cluded in a Bell test. For instance the CHSH inequality
has a classical bound of 2, and quantum theory can vio-
late this to a maximal value of 2
√
2, called the Tsirelson
bound. An experiment that maximally violates the in-
equality can be constructed from measuring the observ-
ables
X or Z (94)
on one qubit, and
Z −X√
2
or −Z −X√
2
(95)
on the other, starting with a system in the singlet state.
For a complete description see Nielsen and Chuang [30,
p. 111]. In Hilbert space the observables in expression
(95) has eigenbases that are offset with 22.5◦ from the
eigenbases of those in expression (94). In QSL we do not
have measurements with this relationship between each
other.
So, in QSL we have maximally entangled states, but
cannot violate Bell inequalities. Obtaining a violation
from QSL, which is a local realist model, would contra-
dict Bell’s theorem [3].
Another phenomenon that QSL cannot reproduce is
the contextual correlations in the Peres-Mermin square,
which is an explicit example of the Kochen-Spekker the-
orem [4]. This was shown by Pusey [37], not in the QSL
representation, but with his stabilizer representation of
Spekkens’ model. However, Kleinmann et al. [5] initi-
ated work on extending Spekkens’ model to reproduce
the contextual correlations that can be seen from Pauli
group measurements. Their work was later concluded by
Harrysson [45]. It is also interesting to note that corre-
lations seen from measurement sequences in the Peres-
Mermin square have an efficient simulation according to
the Gottesman-Knill theorem [12, 46].
2.2.8 Superdense Coding
Superdense coding is the name of a protocol that in a
sense allows one party, Alice, to convey two bits of infor-
mation m1,m0 to the other party, Bob, by only interact-
ing with one qubit. It is however a two qubit protocol as
shown by Figure 13.
|0〉 H
|0〉 X Z
M
m1 m0
Bob
Alice
Figure 13: Protocol for superdense coding. Alice can
convey two bits of information m1 and m0 to Bob by
only interacting with one qubit of a correlated pair.
First create the state |Ψ+〉, give one of the two qubits
to Alice and the other qubit to Bob. Depending on which
of the four messages that Alice wants to send to Bob, she
17
applies I, X, Z, or Y to her qubit, creating
I ⊗ I 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉)
X ⊗ I 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√2 (|10〉+ |01〉)
Z ⊗ I 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√2 (|00〉 − |11〉)
Y ⊗ I 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√2 (|10〉 − |01〉).
(96)
She then sends her qubit to Bob. A Bell state measure-
ment will allow Bob to perfectly distinguish the state of
the pair and deduce Alice’s message.
In QSL the state simulating |Ψ+〉 is (R,R′) (R,R′),
and when Alice applies I,X ,Z or Y the result is
I × I (R,R′) (R,R′) = (R,R′) (R,R′),
X × I (R,R′) (R,R′) = (R,R′) (R,R′),
Z × I (R,R′) (R,R′) = (R,R′) (R,R′), or
Y × I (R,R′) (R,R′) = (R,R′) (R,R′)
(97)
respectively. As previously stated, a Bell state measure-
ment returns the XOR (the correlation) between the two
computational bits and the two phase bits. This mea-
surement on the above states will yield 00, 01, 10, or 11,
respectively. Thus, we also have superdense coding in
QSL.
The reason that Alice can convey a 2 bit message to
Bob by sending him one elementary QSL system, is that
each QSL system contains 2 bits. It is true that Bob can-
not access both bit values, since he is restricted to only
retrieving 1 bit of information from each system. He can
retrieve both bits of the message only because there is a
second system, initially highly correlated with the first,
and where the correlations are manipulated by Alice.
2.3 Higher Number of Elementary Sys-
tems
Going to higher number of elementary systems, QSL de-
parts from Spekkens’ toy model to become a less restric-
tive theory. Systems still compose under the Cartesian
product, and the following notation is used
(xn−1, pn−1) . . . (x1, p1) (x0, p0)
= (
∑
2ixi,
∑
2ipi) = (x, p).
(98)
Sometimes we will use a separation between different reg-
isters with the notation (x, p) (x′, p′), where x, p, x′ and
p′ will be integers modulo a power-of-two.
2.3.1 Teleportation
Before we introduce the new transformations, let us take
one more example with more than two qubits.
Teleportation is the name of a protocol where, given
some pre-shared entanglement, Bob can recreate a qubit
state |ψ〉 made available to Alice, from information from
Alice on the result of a Bell-state measurement per-
formed by her.
|0〉 H X Z |ψ〉
|0〉
|ψ〉 H
BobEPR-Source
Alice
Figure 14: The teleportation protocol.
The protocol is shown in Figure 14, and proceeds as fol-
lows. Alice and Bob share a qubit pair in the Bell state
|Ψ+〉 created by the H and a CNOT gates at the left of
Figure 14,
|00〉 |ψ〉 → |00〉+ |11〉√
2
|ψ〉 . (99)
Alice then correlates the state |ψ〉 = a |0〉 + b |1〉, that
she wants to teleport to Bob, with her part of the pair.
This is done using a Bell state measurement built from
the next CNOT and H gates.
a(|00〉+ |11〉) |0〉+ b(|00〉+ |11〉) |1〉√
2
→a(|00〉+ |11〉) |0〉+ b(|01〉+ |10〉) |1〉√
2
.
(100)
After the Hadamard, the state can be written as
(a |0〉+ b |1〉) |00〉+ (a |0〉 − b |1〉) |01〉√
2
+(a |1〉+ b |0〉) |10〉+ (a |1〉 − b |0〉) |11〉√
2
.
(101)
Alice measures her two qubits and sends the result to
Bob. We see from expression (101) that if the least sig-
nificant bit that Bob receives is set, then he needs to ap-
ply Z to his qubit, and if the most significant is set apply
an X. Doing so, he retrieves the state a |0〉+ b |1〉 = |ψ〉.
The same protocol (Figure 14) with QSL gives
(0, R) (0, R′) (bx, bp)
H×I×I−−−−−→ (R, 0) (0, R′) (bx, bp)
CNOT ×I−−−−−−→ (R,R′) (R,R′) (bx, bp)
I×CNOT−−−−−−→ (R,R′) (R⊕ bx, R′) (bx, bp ⊕R′)
I×I×H−−−−−→ (R,R′) (R⊕ bx, R′) (bp ⊕R′, bx).
(102)
By the two measurements Alice now retrieves the values
of R⊕bx and R′⊕bp, and sends them to Bob. If the first
bit is set he performs an X , i.e., adds R⊕ bx to the com-
putational bit modulo 2. If the latter is set he performs
a Z, i.e., adds R′ ⊕ bp to the phase bit, also modulo 2.
The state he ends up with is
(R⊕ (R⊕ bx), R′ ⊕ (R′ ⊕ bp)) = (bx, bp), (103)
which is the state Alice was provided with. Thus, Al-
ice and Bob cooperate to “teleport” the state of Alice’s
input system to Bob. Just as in the quantum protocol,
Alice does not at any point retrieve any information on
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the state provided to her. That is, Alice and Bob coop-
erate to update the state of Bob’s system to correspond
to the state of Alice’s input system, independent of what
the state of that input system is, just as in the quantum
protocol.
In classical communication this is not described as
teleportation, but rather as encryption and decryption
through the One-Time-Pad, where the random numbers
R and R′ act as secret shared key between Alice and
Bob. Therefore, in QSL (or Spekkens’ toy model), the
teleportation protocol is equivalent to (two uses of) the
One-Time-Pad.
We should note that quantum teleportation goes be-
yond this, since we are restricted to simulate a finite
subset of quantum states being teleported, rather than
the continuum of states in quantum theory.
2.3.2 Transformations
Here we introduce a transformation unavailable in
Spekkens’ model, and as we will see it take us out to
a less restricted model. The QSL Toffoli construction is
shown in Figure 16A., and produces the mapping(
x2, p2
)(
x1, p1
)(
x0, p0
) 7→
(
x2, p2 ⊕ p0x1
)(
x1, p1 ⊕ p0x2
)(
x0 ⊕ x2x1, p0
)
.
(104)
It is constructed in this way to uphold quantum gate
identities like those in Figure 15A. and Figure 15B. If
the input of one of the two control qubits is initiated in
|1〉, the effect is that of a CNOT over two other systems.
Also, if the target qubit is initiated in |−〉, the effect is
that of a CZ over the two control qubits.
There is another identity using two CNOTs to pro-
duce a controlled-SWAP, called Fredkin gate (see Fig-
ure 15C). The QSL analogue of this is shown in Fig-
ure 16B. and produces the mapping(
x2, p2
)(
x1, p1
)(
x0, p0
) 7→
(
x2, p2 ⊕ (x1 ⊕ x0)(p1 ⊕ p0)
)(
x1 ⊕ x2(x1 ⊕ x0), p1 ⊕ x2(p1 ⊕ p0)
)(
x0 ⊕ x2(x1 ⊕ x0), p0 ⊕ x2(p1 ⊕ p0)
)
.
(105)
2.4 Properties and Relations to other
Theories
Simulated quantum phenomena in QSL have an efficient
simulation on a classical probabilistic Turing machine. It
uses two classical bits for each elementary system, and
all QSL-gates are constructed from a constant number of
classical reversible gates. We therefore have the following
simple lemma.
Lemma 2.1: Any quantum circuits, constructed from
gates also present in QSL, have a classical simulation
that requires at most a constant overhead in resources.
It can in turn be simulated in polynomial time, in the
size of the circuit, on a classical probabilistic Turing ma-
chine.
A. |1〉
X
=
X
B.
|−〉 X
=
C.
X X ≡
X
Figure 15: Quantum gate identities. A. Toffoli gate
with one of the controlling qubits initiated in |1〉 results
in a CNOT over the other two qubits. B. Toffoli gate
with the target qubit initiated in |−〉 results in a CZ over
the cotrol qubits. C. Identity connecting the Toffoli and
Fredkin gate.
A.
X
∼
B.
∼
Figure 16: QSL construcion of the Toffoli gate (A.)
and Fredkin (B.), constructed to uphold the identities
in Figure 15.
2.4.1 The relation to stabilizer quantum me-
chanics, locality and contextuality
Another theory that is computationally tractable is the
stabilizer subtheory. As the name suggests it is a subthe-
ory of quantum theory where one is restricted to trans-
formations from the Clifford group (generated by the
Hadamard, phase-gate, and CNOT), and Pauli group
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measurements. Being restricted to these operations, one
can only reach the stabilizer states. Classical controls
are also allowed. This subtheory has an efficient classi-
cal simulation and this is shown by the Gottesman-Knill
theorem [12]. An in-depth discussion of its resource re-
quirements can be found in Aaronson and Gottesman
[46].
It turns out that Spekkens’ model is closely related to
the stabilizer subtheory [47]. Pusey [37] showed that the
number of states in Spekkens’ model is the same as the
stabilizer states, and it has operations that are similar to
the generators of the Clifford group. However, it is not
a restricted version of quantum theory — as we saw in
Section 2.1 there are transformations that correspond to
anti-unitary transformations.
QSL contains Spekkens’ model and is therefore not a
restricted version of quantum theory. It is per construc-
tion completely local, since all information propagates
through local interactions, while the stabilizer subtheory
is not. At this point, it is important to note that both
QSL and Spekkens’ model are both also non-contextual,
in contrast to stabilizer QM. Consider an observable A
that is jointly measurable with observables B and C,
where B and C might not be jointly measurable. Then,
we can measure A together with B, or A together with
C. In quantum theory, A would commute with both B
and C. Even so, any attempt to assign values to the out-
comes from measuring A, B, and C can force the value
of A to depend on the context of it being measured to-
gether with B or with C, resulting in a contextual model
[4].
Definition 2.1: A non-contextual model is a model
where measurement outcomes do not depend on the con-
text of the measurement.
Using the above definition, we arrive at the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.1: QSL is a non-contextual model.
Proof. Per construction, QSL has a simultaneous value
assignment to all observable quantities, and these values
do not change dependent on the measurement or mea-
surement context that we choose to use to retrieve them.
Thus, measurements outcomes in QSL does not depend
on the context of the measurement.
2.4.2 QSL extends the state space of Spekkens’
model
QSL also allows for a strictly larger set of states than
Spekkens’ model and the stabilizer subtheory. To see
why, consider the construction in Figure 17 that pro-
duces a simulation of the GHZ-state
|000〉+ |111〉√
2
. (106)
If the least significant system is measured in the compu-
tational basis, the value of x is retrieved. If the second
system is measured in the phase basis, the value of y⊕xz
is retrieved. This information is enough to completely
specify the state of the most significant system, i.e., we
know the state of both the computational and phase bit,
resulting in zero uncertainty.
|0〉 H
|0〉
|0〉
∼
0 x
x y ⊕ xz
0 x
y y ⊕ xz
0 x
z z
Figure 17: One construction that produces a GHZ-
state, and the matching QSL construction.
We can repeat this scheme retrieving the basic bit
values of a fourth system while reusing the two least
significant systems as auxiliaries. By induction, with n
repetitions we can learn the basic bit values of n QSL-
systems, using only two auxiliary systems. Using the
available reversible transformations, or permutations, we
can create any value of the basic bit values we desire. The
output of this procedure is not a valid (epistemic) state
in Spekkens’ model, and this has consequences for the
set of pure states in QSL, because pure states are now
states where both bit values are known.
This also enables a larger mixed-state space. It is
true that Spekkens’ original model [13] does not allow
for general mixtures of states since knowledge is defined
in terms of partitions of the phase space corresponding
to the support of the probability distributions used, and
not the distributions themselves. For example, the only
single-system mixed state allowed in Ref [13] is the com-
pletely mixed state, see Equation (21). However, it is
simple to create any classical mixture of the six avail-
able pure states, corresponding to the octahedron in Fig-
ure 18. For example, to create a classical mixture of two
pure states with probability p for one of them, all that is
needed is a number of auxiliary systems that is linear in
the number of bits of p, all in the completely mixed state.
Measurement of each system gives a fair coin toss, and
simple binary classical comparison with the number p
gives a binary output which is 1 with probability p. This
can then be used to choose what state to prepare, re-
sulting in the desired classical mixture of the two states.
The addition in QSL of the QSL-Toffoli enables mixtures
within the larger tetrahedron, but note that the states
outside the octahedron does not correspond to quantum
states, at least not in a simple manner.
Compare this to how with stabilizer quantum the-
ory we start with quantum theory and restrict it to a
finite set of states, transformations, and measurement.
Adding the quantum Toffoli to stabilizer quantum the-
ory we asymptotically recover quantum theory. For one
and two elementary systems, QSL and Spekkens’ theory
are equivalent, and can be derived by imposing restric-
tions on a classical statistical theory over the phase space
described by Z2n2 (see [47]). Adding the QSL-Toffoli to
Spekkens’ model we can reach the ontic states and any
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mixtures of these. Thus, asymptotically we recover the
unrestricted classical theory over Z2n2 .
•
•
•
•
•
•
(0, 0)
(0, 1)
(1, 0)
(1, 1)
(R,R)
(R, 0)
(R,R)
(R, 1)
(0, R)
(1, R)
Figure 18: Representation of the state space of a single
elementary system, with a geometry of a tetrahedron in-
scribing an octahedron. To aid with the visualization: if
we take the vertices of the tetrahedron and fold them to
one of the closest vertices on the octahedron, we recover
the octahedron.
2.4.3 QSL is an example of a Generalized Prob-
ability Theory
Common for all these theories, quantum theory, the sta-
bilizer subtheory, Spekkens’ model, and QSL is that they
are generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs). That is, if
we define a probabilistic theory D aiming to describe
the effects of measurement outcomes from these theo-
ries, it is necessarily non-Kolmogorovian. To see why
let us consider X = 1 and Z = 1 as events in D. The
observables do not commute in any of the four theories
and are not simultaneously measurable. This means that
{X = 1} ∩ {Z = 1} is not well-defined, and therefore, D
does not form a σ-algebra as required by Kolmogorov’s
third axiom. For another and more comprehensive ac-
count of this see Kleinmann [48].
A σ-algebra is a collection of sets closed under the op-
erations of complement, and countable intersection and
union [49]. If these sets — connected to events — are
measurable, they can be used to form a logic. With
the complement, intersection, and union as the negation,
conjunction, and disjunction respectively (NOT, AND,
and OR), we recover a Boolean algebra [38, p. 297]; the
logic underpinning classical probability theory. However,
since measurable quantities in the four theories do not
form a σ-algebra — some quantities are not simultane-
ously measurable — they cannot form a Boolean algebra.
Systems that are described by these theories do not obey
classical logic.
A hands-on example of non-classical logic, closely re-
lated to Spekkens’ model and QSL, is owing to Cohen
[50, p. 21]. He considers a firefly in a box which is either
lit up or not. The box can be viewed from the front side,
and from one of the adjacent sides. On the front side of
the box there are two windows, one to the right and one
to the left. Also, to the side of the box there are two
windows, one to the right and one to the left. Now, if
the firefly is lit up, a single observer (without any depth
perception) looking into either the front or side windows
will only be able to tell whether the firefly was on the left
or right side, or close to or far from the front side of the
box. We can think of the box as divided into four parti-
tions and a single observer can only distinguish between
two of them at a time. Cohen then writes
“If we believe that [this] is the best possible
characterization of the firefly system, then
we believe our firefly in a box is a nonclassi-
cal physical system, because [looking at both
front and side windows] cannot be performed
simultaneously. If we believe that we can
[look into both front and side windows] si-
multaneously, perhaps by positioning two ob-
servers, one at each window, [...] then we
believe our system is classical and [that it
has a better characterization].” — Cohen [50,
p. 25]
The connections to Spekkens’ model and QSL is clear.
The four partitions of the box relate to Spekkens’ four
ontic states, and we can relate the two windows to the
two classical bits, the computational and phase bit, of a
QSL-system. Note that if the firefly does not light up,
the observer has no idea as to where it is, and the system
is in the maximally mixed state. Cohen shows that the
system is classical by finding a refined description, just
like Spekkens’ model and QSL is constructed in a way
permitting a finer description, but without that finer de-
scription, all three operate per definition according to a
non-classical logic.
To summarize, Spekkens’ and QSL are not restricted
quantum theories, like the stabilizer subtheory, they are
restricted classical theories. They are generalized proba-
bilistic theories and systems behave according to a non-
classical logic, because of the restriction that turn them
into generalized probabilistic theories.
We will now switch our attention from protocols de-
scribing quantum phenomena, to protocols for solving
computational problems. First out is the Bernstein-
Vazirani problem, which builds on an important prim-
itive in quantum computation known as Fourier sam-
pling.
3 The Bernstein-Vazirani Prob-
lem
In 1993 Ethan Bernstein and Umesh Vazirani [19, 20]
devised the first decision problem that showed a signifi-
cant oracle separation between the quantum and classical
(probabilistic) computational models. In other words,
they provided an oracle algorithm separating the compu-
tational complexity class BPP from the matching class
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for quantum machines — BQP. BPP contains all deci-
sion problems that can be solved in polynomial time with
an error probability bounded away from 1/2 on a proba-
bilistic Turing machine, while BQP contains all decision
problems that can be solved in polynomial time with an
error probability bounded away from 1/2 on a quantum
Turing machine [20].
3.1 Problem Formulation
The problem they solved is called Recursive Fourier
Sampling, but here we will only consider the base prob-
lem that we call the Bernstein-Vazirani problem,
where there is less than the above-mentioned advantage,
see below. Consider that we are given access to an ora-
cle computing a Boolean function, f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
promised to be of the particular linear form f(x) = s ·x,
where x, s ∈ {0, 1}n. The task is now to find the “secret”
string s.
|0〉 /n H⊗n H⊗n
|1〉 H
Uf
Figure 19: Quantum circuit for the Bernstein-
Vazirani algorithm
3.2 Classical Algorithm
In the case where the oracle only gives us access to the
function values, we query the function for all inputs x
with a Hamming weight of 1, i.e., all inputs
x˜i =
{
xj = 1, for j = i
0, otherwise,
(107)
where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is the bit-index. Then the func-
tion will answer with one new bit of information about
s for each query, f(x˜i) = si. After n queries we have
retrieved s.
3.3 Quantum Algorithm
If instead the oracle is given as a unitary transformation,
adding the result of the query to the query-qubit in the
computational basis, specifically |x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉,
then a quantum algorithm can solve the problem with a
single query.
Algorithm 3.1: (Bernstein and Vazirani [19,
20]) Proceed with the following steps.
1. Prepare an n-qubit query register and an ad-
ditional answer qubit in the state |0n〉 |1〉.
2. Apply the Walsh-Hadamard transform to the
query register and the output qubit.
3. Apply the oracle.
4. Apply the Walsh-Hadamard transform to the
query register.
5. Measure the query register in the computa-
tional basis.
The measurement in the last step will reveal the se-
cret string s.
From step 1 and 2 we have
|0n〉 |1〉 H
⊗n⊗H−−−−−→ 1√
2n
∑
x
|x〉 |−〉 . (108)
From here on, if nothing else is stated, summation in-
dexes run over the variable’s whole domain. Applying
the oracle (step 3) we get
1√
2n+1
∑
x
|x〉 (|0⊕ f(x)〉 − |1⊕ f(x)〉)
= 1√
2n+1
∑
x
(−1)f(x) |x〉 (|0〉 − |1〉) ,
(109)
and in step 4 the inverse Hadamard transform on the
query register gives
1
2n
√
2
∑
x,z
(−1)f(x)−x·z |z〉 (|0〉 − |1〉)
= 1
2n
√
2
∑
x,z
(−1)(s−z)·x |z〉 (|0〉 − |1〉)
= 1√
2
|s〉 (|0〉 − |1〉),
(110)
where the last identity is given by evaluating the sum
over x to obtain 2n if z = s and zero otherwise. By mea-
suring the query register (step 5) we retrieve s by calling
the quantum oracle only once. This is compared to the
linear number of times in the case when we only have
access to the function output.
3.4 QSL Simulation
To simulate this with QSL the first thing we need is to
define the oracle. We know that it is promised to per-
form f(x) = x · s over the computational basis, and such
oracle can be constructed by only using CNOT gates.
With their targets at the answer-qubit, and the controls
on the qubits in the query register that corresponds to
where the bit values si in the secret string are set. This
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|0〉 H H
|0〉 H H
|0〉 H H
|0〉 H H
|1〉 H X X X
0 1
0 0
0 1
0 1
1
Figure 20: Example of a quantum and the corresponding QSL algorithm for solving the Bernstein-Vazirani
problem when the secret string is s = (1011). The unsigned red inputs and outputs of the QSL-circuit are all
uniformly distributed random bits.
will produce the desired function. Observe that this al-
lows us to construct the whole algorithm using only Clif-
ford group operations, and it is well-known that there is
an efficient classical simulation via the Gottesman-Knill
theorem. However, the Stabilizer subtheory is a nonlocal
contextual model, while QSL is local and non-contextual.
Therefore, if this construction works in QSL we can rule
out these from being required properties.
First, prepare n QSL-bits for the query register all in
the (0, R) state, and one QSL-bit for the answer register
initiated to (1, R)
(0n, R) (1, R′) (111)
where R is a uniformly distributed random bit string,
and R′ is a uniformly distributed random bit. Applying
the QSL-gate simulating the Hadamard to all QSL-bits
gives
(R, 0n) (R′, 1) . (112)
In general, simulating the above construction of the
oracle will result in the following map
(x, p) (a, b) 7→ (x, p⊕ bs) (a⊕ f(x), b). (113)
For the state in expression (112) the oracle will add
f(R) (modulo 2) to the computational bit of the answer
register. Since the phase bit b of the answer register is
set, the oracle will also have the effect of flipping the
phase bits of every QSL-system that acts as a control in
the query register. Since the phase bits in the query reg-
ister are all zero, flipping each phase bit for which si = 1.
This will induce s into the phase, giving the state(
R, s
) (
R′ ⊕ f(R), 1). (114)
The Walsh-Hadamard transform again swaps all compu-
tational and phase bits of the query register(
s,R
) (
R′ ⊕ f(R), 1). (115)
Now, measuring the computational bits of the query reg-
ister will reveal the secret string s, at the cost of only one
oracle call. Figure 20 shows an example for when the se-
cret string is s = (1011).
This is a special case of the more general procedure
known as Fourier Sampling, where all Boolean func-
tions are allowed, that is, we are not restricted to func-
tions of the form f(x) = x · s. In Fourier Sampling
the outcomes of a computational basis measurement is
weighted by the absolute square of the Fourier (Walsh-
Hadamard) coefficients. In the quantum algorithm, the
Fourier-basis contains the Fourier transform of the map,
giving direct access to sampling from that distribution.
For a classical reversible oracle that only gives access to
the function values, the values of the Fourier transform
is not directly accessible. In other words, having access
to the function encoded in a unitary operator enables us
to sample from some distributions related to the func-
tion, not only the function itself. To sample from these
distributions only having access to the function output
might be hard. A discussion about this in relation to
the Bernstein-Vazirani problem can be found in [51].
The Deutsch-Jozsa problem in the next section is also
a special case of Fourier Sampling.
4 The Deutsch-Jozsa Problem
The Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm [10] was the first oracle
algorithm that suggested there could be a substantial
advantage of doing information processing on quantum
systems. It is a generalization of the Deutsch algorithm
(see Section 2.2.6), and have been used in many exper-
imental demonstrations of quantum computing. For a
detailed account see [52] and citations therein.
4.1 Problem Formulation
We are going to use two different problem formulations,
the first is due to Cleve et al. [32].
Definition 4.1: Consider that you are given access to
an oracle encoding a Boolean function, guaranteed to be
either constant or balanced. The problem is to determine
whether the function is constant or balanced.
A constant Boolean function is one that always re-
turns 1, or always returns 0. While a balanced function
returns an equal number of 1s and 0s, i.e., the string of
values for all 2n possible input values will have a Ham-
ming weight of 2n−1. To distinguish this string of all out-
put states (f(2n−1) . . . f(1)f(0)), that completely char-
acterize the function, from the bit-string that we usually
call output, we will call it a function string.
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The second problem formulation we are going to use
is the original formulation by Deutsch and Jozsa [10].
Definition 4.2: Consider that you are given access to
an oracle implementing a Boolean function. The prob-
lem is to determine whether
(i) the function is not constant, or
(ii) the function is not balanced.
Here the function is not guaranteed to be of one or
the other kind, it can be any Boolean function, and one
of these statements can always be found true. This is
therefore a decision problem in contrast to the promise
problem in Definition 4.1.
For completeness, we will go through the algorithms
for solving this problem having access to an oracle im-
plementing the function over bits, qubits, and then QSL-
bits. We will also consider both definitions of the prob-
lem.
4.2 Deterministic and Probabilistic Al-
gorithms
If we get access to an oracle that computes the function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, then we can query the function
2n−1 + 1 times and decide both problems. If all these
outputs are 0 (or 1) then it cannot be balanced, and we
have solved the problem described in Definition 4.2. The
problem as described in Definition 4.1 is also solved by
the same algorithm, the only difference is the promise.
This algorithm solves the problem (according to both
definitions) with certainty, but with a number of queries
exponential in n. This is viewed as evidence that, rela-
tive to the oracle, these problems are not in P (the class
of problems solvable in polynomial time).
However, if we only require the algorithm to return
the solution with an error probability bounded away from
1/2, they can be solved with only a few (constant num-
ber of) queries. An algorithm that fails with at most
probability 1/4 is to query the function three times, and
answer constant (or not balanced in the decision prob-
lem) if all three outputs are equal, otherwise balanced
(or not constant in the decision problem). The error
probability can be calculated as follows.
Since balanced functions have an equal amount of 1s
and 0s in the function string, choosing inputs at random
we will see a 0 or a 1 at the output with equal probability.
So, if the function is balanced, and we query the func-
tion three times, the output (000) or (111) both occur
with probability 1/8. Thus, there is then a 1/4 prob-
ability of wrongfully guess the function to be constant
(not balanced), and a corresponding success probability
of 3/4, independent of the problem size. If the function is
constant (not balanced), the algorithm will succeed with
unit probability. For the explicit analysis see [10]. This
also shows that, relative to the same oracle, this problem
is in BPP, according to both definitions.
4.3 Quantum Algorithm
Here we instead are given access to a quantum oracle,
namely, one that implements the function as a unitary
over the computational basis. Specifically,
Uf |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 . (116)
The algorithm is as follows (see also Figure 21).
Algorithm 4.1: (Deutsch and Jozsa [10]) Pro-
ceed with the following steps.
1. Prepare an n-qubit query register in the state
|0〉, and an output qubit in |1〉.
2. Apply the Walsh-Hadamard transform to the
query register and the output qubit.
3. Apply the oracle.
4. Apply the Walsh-Hadamard transform to the
query register.
5. Test if the output state of the query regis-
ter is |0〉 by a measurement of the observable
|0〉〈0| ⊗ I2.
If the test is positive, output “constant,” otherwise
“balanced”.
In the algorithm, step 1 and 2 result in
|0n〉 |1〉 H
⊗n⊗H−−−−−→ 1√
2n
∑
x
|x〉 |−〉 . (117)
The oracle (step 3) transforms this into
1√
2n+1
∑
x
|x〉
(
|f(x)〉 − ∣∣f(x)〉)
= 1√
2n
∑
x
(−1)f(x) |x〉 |−〉 .
(118)
After the final Walsh-Hadamard transform of the query
register (step 4) this becomes
1
2n
∑
x,z
(−1)f(x)+x·z |z〉 |−〉 . (119)
The query register part of this state is measured to find
the value of the Hermitian projector |0〉〈0|, which can be
seen as a test of whether the system is in the state |0〉,
in other words, it tests whether “the state of the query
register is unchanged after applying the circuit”. This
test will be positive with probability∣∣∣∣∣ 12n ∑
x
(−1)f(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
{
1, if f(x) is constant
0, if f(x) is balanced,
(120)
and that allows us to solve the problem with only one
query, showing that relative to the oracle this problem
according to both definitions is in the complexity class
EQP (problems exactly solvable on a quantum machine
in Polynomial time)[19].
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|0〉 /n H⊗n Uf H⊗n
|1〉 H
Uf
Figure 21: Circuit representation of the Deutsch-
Jozsa algorithm.
4.4 The Problem for Small Input
It is well-known that for a small number of input qubits
the quantum algorithm admits an efficient classical sim-
ulation. Collins et al. [11] pointed out that using the
Deutch-Jozsa algorithm for a meaningful test of quan-
tum computation requires the number of input qubits to
be strictly larger than two. Similar findings have been
made in Calude [53] and Abbott [54].
The observation of Collins et al. [11] was that the al-
gorithm was completely independent of the answer regis-
ter, which therefore can be omitted. The important part
of the construction is that it produces the correct phase
imprint in the query register. This is sometimes referred
to as a phase oracle. Please observe that this kind of
oracle does not allow for retrieving function values, and
cannot be used to employ the regular solution, but only
makes the quantum algorithm available. Further, having
access to a unitary implementing a Boolean function, a
phase oracle can efficiently be constructed [20].
We can summarize these results simply by the fact
that all balanced and constant functions over one and
two bits have oracles that only use Clifford group op-
erations (see Figure 22) and therefore admit a classical
simulation in ether QSL [14] or the stabilizer subtheory.
X
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X
10
X
0011
X
1100
X
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X
1010
X X
X
1001
X X
X
0110
Figure 22: Explicit implementations of all balanced or-
acles for the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm for one and two
qubit input.
For three qubits of input, and not constructing phase
oracles, all 72 balanced and constant function can be
implemented in a reversible circuit using only one Toffoli
gate and five CNOTs (for the explicit implementations
see Appendix A). Mapping these circuits into the corre-
sponding QSL-circuits, we obtain an implementation of
an oracle for each of the 72 functions, and using these
to simulate the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm, QSL solves
the problem with unit probability.
In general, there are two constant functions and
(
2n
2n−1
)
≥
( 2n
2n−1
)2n−1
= 22
n−1
(121)
balanced functions, because of the simple bound
(
n
k
)
≥
(n
k
)k
. (122)
This makes it intractable to construct, or even to in-
dex, all oracles explicitly. Thus, the oracle paradigm un-
avoidable in this problem setting. This will be discussed
further in Section 5.
4.5 QSL Simulation Guaranteed a Con-
stant or Balanced Function
To approach the problem with QSL we need to determine
the effect of an oracle from QSL-bits onto QSL-bits. We
will start by specifying a valid implementation of a quan-
tum oracle, and then simply map all the quantum gates
of the implementation into QSL-gates. This will allow us
to obtain an expression for the effect of the QSL oracle,
and show that there exists an oracle corresponding to a
simulation of a valid quantum oracle. We then go on to
show that if we are given access to this oracle, that is
sufficient to solve the problem with a single query.
The implementation of the quantum circuit that we
are going to use is shown in Figure 23, and employs two
Toffoli gates and two boxes representing a permutation
pi ∈ S2n of the computational basis states. These can be
constructed from NOT , CNOT, and Toffoli gates, and
at most one auxiliary bit [55].
There is one parameter |b〉, that determines what
type of function the circuit implements. If |b0〉 = |1〉
the function is balanced and if |b0〉 = |0〉 it is constant.
If the function is constant, the value is f(x) = b1. The
idea is to use a simple construction for one particular
balanced function, and then use a permutation of the
possible values x to make all balanced functions avail-
able. If |b0〉 = |1〉 and the permutation is the iden-
tity, the Toffoli connected to |b0〉 will give the balanced
function f(x) = xn−1 If the permutation is any other
than the identity permutation, the input values are per-
muted before the function is calculated and written to
the answer register. This makes all balanced functions
available in the used reversible circuitry. The inverse
permutation is used on the query register to uncom-
pute the permutation, assuring that we get the map
|x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉.
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|x0〉 |x0〉... ...|xn−1〉 |xn−1〉
|b0〉 |b0〉
|b1〉 |b1〉
|y〉 X X |y ⊕ f(x)〉
pif pi†f
...
Figure 23: A specific implementation of a quantum or-
acle that can be used to solve the Deutsch-Jozsa prob-
lem in Definition 4.1. The internal parameter b0 chooses
between a constant or balanced function, and if the func-
tion is constant, the value is b1. For balanced functions,
the idea is that the first Toffoli acting as a CNOT to
produce one specific balanced function (if the permuta-
tion pif is the identity), adding the most significant bit
to the output, f(x) = xn−1. Access to all balanced func-
tions is then obtained by an arbitrary permutation of the
output.
We start by analyzing the effect of the permutation
box mapped into QSL. Its effect can be separated into
two parts, one is the effect on the computational bits and
one on the phase bits. The effect on the computational
bit-string is the same as the effect of the quantum gate
pif on the computational basis. The effect over the phase
bit-string will be another permutation, and since any
computational basis permutation can be built from X,
CNOT, and Toffoli gates, the corresponding QSL gates
can be used to build a QSL permutation In general, if the
construction uses Toffoli gates, the exact permutation on
the phase bit-string will depend not only on which com-
putational basis-string permutation is used, but also on
the actual value of the computational bits. Let us call
this permutation pif,x. As we shall see, it does not mat-
ter precisely which permutation is realized, only that the
resulting map is invertible. The corresponding map to a
computational basis permutation pif in QSL will be
(x, p) 7→ (pif (x), pif,x(p)), (123)
and the effect of the inverse on the latter state, after a
possible change of the phase bits, will be
(pif (x), p′) 7→
(
x, pi−1f,x(p
′)
)
. (124)
Then, the overall effect of the circuit in Figure 23 is
(x, p) (y, r) pif−−→ (pif (x), pif,x(p)) (y, r)
Ta−→ (pif (x), pif,x(p) + b0rδn−1) (y ⊕ b0pif (x)n−1, r)
Tb−→ (pif (x), pif,x(p) + b0rδn−1) (y ⊕ b0pif (x)n−1 ⊕ b1, r)
=
(
pif (x), pif,x(p) + b0rδn−1
) (
y ⊕ f(x), r)
pi−1
f−−→
(
x, pi−1f,x
(
pif,x(p) + b0rδn−1
)) (
y ⊕ f(x), r),
(125)
where pif (x)n−1 denotes the most significant bit of the
input vector after it has gone through the permutation,
and δn−1 is the bit vector for which the most significant
bit is 1 and all others 0.
If we now get oracle access to this function we can use
it to query for particular function values, by preparing
the registers in the states corresponding to |x〉 |0〉 and
applying the oracle. We can also use it to determine
whether the function is constant or balanced by running
the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm. This gives
(0, X) (1, Y ) H
×(n+1)
−−−−−→ (X, 0) (Y, 1)
Uf−−→
(
X,pi−1f,X(pif,X(0) + b0δn−1
))
(Y ⊕ f(X), 1)
H×n−−−→
(
pi−1f,X
(
pif,X(0) + b0δn−1
)
, X
)
(Y ⊕ f(X), 1).
(126)
If the function is constant, then b0 = 0 and measurement
of the query register will return pi−1f,X
(
pif,X(0)
)
= 0. If
the function is balanced, then the measurement returns
pi−1f,X
(
pif,X(0) + δn−1
) 6= 0, which is part from zero since
pi−1f,X is injective. Note that the detailed behavior of the
permutation pif,X is not important since knowing that
it is invertible is enough. We have proven the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.1: There is an efficient QSL algorithm that
solves the Deutsch-Jozsa problem by a single query to
the oracle. This algorithm has an efficient classical sim-
ulation on a PTM.
That the simulation is efficient follows from the fact
that the QSL circuit uses a number of gates polyno-
mial in the input size, relative to the oracle, and from
Lemma 2.1. The QSL algorithm gives the same answers
as the quantum algorithm: the zero bitstring if the func-
tion is constant, and a nonzero bitstring if the function is
balanced. It is thus a faithful simulation of the quantum
algorithm, in other words, these procedures are opera-
tionally the same.
4.6 QSL Simulation Accepting Arbitrary
Boolean Functions
To approach the less strict problem formulation (Defi-
nition 4.2) we need a construction that can produce all
Boolean functions. To do that we have chosen an im-
plementation using a comparator. A comparator is a
device that compares two values, and we have chosen to
compare x + a and 2n, and output 1 if x + a ≥ 2n and
0 otherwise. This is an example of a function f(x) that
output 1 for a of the possible inputs, and 0 otherwise, for
each a ∈ {0, . . . , 2n− 1}. A generic such function can be
generated by using the computational basis permutation
presented in Section 4.5.
Such a comparator can be built in reversible logic by
adapting a construction for a ripple-carry adder, known
as a Cuccaro adder [56, 57]. The Cuccaro adder uses four
reversible logic registers (cin, x, a, z), where x and a are
input-strings of equal length, and cin, and z are single-
bit registers for carry-in and carry-out respectively. The
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mapping is
(cin, x, a, z) 7→ (cin, x, x+ a, z ⊕ cout), (127)
but since we want the above comparator, we note that
cout is set if and only if x+ a ≥ 2n (generating a carry).
By using the initial value z = 0 and uncomputing the
ripple-carry-adder intermediate values instead of com-
pleting the subtraction (see [57]), we obtain the map
(0, x, a, 0) 7→ (0, x, a, x+ a ≥ 2n). (128)
An illustrative example of a comparator built to com-
pare two 4-bit integers is shown in Figure 25.
|ci〉 X |ci ⊕ ai〉
|xi〉 X |xi ⊕ ai〉
|ai〉 X |ci+1〉
≡
M
A
J
Figure 24: MAJ module where the output carry ci+1 =
ai ⊕ (ci ⊕ ai)(xi ⊕ ai) = aici ⊕ aixi ⊕ cixi.
|cin〉 = |0〉 |0〉
|x0〉 |x0〉
|a0〉 |a0〉
|x1〉 |x1〉
|a1〉 |a1〉
|x2〉 |x2〉
|a2〉 |a2〉
|x3〉 |x3〉
|a3〉 |a3〉
|0〉 X |x+ a ≥ 16〉
M
A
J
M
A
J
M
A
J
M
A
J
M
A
J
†
M
A
J
†
M
A
J
†
M
A
J
†
Figure 25: Quantum circuit of a reversible comparator
for comparing the sum of two 4-bit integers x and a to
the number 24, signaling if x + a ≥ 24 in the answer
register.
To enable the function that is constant 1 one possible
solution is to extend the comparator so that it works for
0 ≤ a ≤ 2n. Inverting the output if the additional bit
an equals 1 gives the constant function 0 for the value
a = 0 and the constant function 1 for the value a = 2n.
The complete construction of the circuit is shown in Fig-
ure 26.
|0〉 |0〉
|x0〉 |x0〉... |a0〉 |a0〉 ...... ... ...|xn−1〉 |xn−1〉|an−1〉 |an−1〉
|an〉 |an〉
|y〉 X X |y ⊕ f(x)〉
pif pi†f
M
A
J-chain
M
A
J-chain †
Figure 26: Construction of a circuit that can give any
Boolean function. The idea is to construct one specific
Boolean function for each number 0 ≤ a ≤ 2n, that give
the output 1 on a inputs by using a comparator. Then
produce the other functions by using a permutation of
the input states. The comparator is built through two
chains of MAJ and MAJ† gates as in Figure 25.
To verify that this gives the correct answer in the
Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm, we need to check the phase
kick-back of the gate array. For a given bit index, the
MAJ andMAJ−1 gates reverse the phase transforma-
tion as well as the computational basis transformation.
The one difference is the possible phase kick-back ⊕ki on
the ai register, between the two gates, from the i + 1st
step of the chain or from the oracle target register if
i + 1 = n. The effect of the three gates in the final
MAJ−1 gate is
(ci ⊕ ai, ·) (xi ⊕ ai, ·) (ci+1, · ⊕ ki)
→ (·, · ⊕ ki(xi ⊕ ai)) (·, · ⊕ ki(ci ⊕ ai)) (·, · ⊕ ki)
→ (·, · ⊕ ki(xi ⊕ ai)) (·, · ⊕ ki(ci ⊕ ai))
× (·, · ⊕ ki ⊕ ki(xi ⊕ ai))
→ (·, · ⊕ ki(xi ⊕ ai)) (·, · ⊕ ki(ci ⊕ ai))
× (·, · ⊕ ki ⊕ ki(xi ⊕ ci))
(129)
There are two cases we need to check. If f is con-
stant then a = 0 or a = 2n, and if f is balanced then
a = 2n−1. In both cases ci = ai = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2,
making ki(ci ⊕ ai) = 0, so the phase kick-back is 0
for all the query register bits except the most signif-
icant bit. For the most significant bit, it is still the
case that cn−1 = 0 so that the phase kick-back is
kn−1(cn−1 ⊕ an−1) = kn−1an−1. The Deutsch-Jozsa
algorithm now gives
(0, X) (1, Y ) H
×(n+1)
−−−−−→ (X, 0) (Y, 1)
Uf−−→
(
X,pi−1f,X(pif,X(0) + an−1δn−1
))
(Y ⊕ f(X), 1)
H×n−−−→
(
pi−1f,X
(
pif,X(0) + an−1δn−1
)
, X
)
(Y ⊕ f(X), 1).
(130)
This is exactly the same behavior as in the previous sec-
tion with a = 2n−1b. In fact, a = 2n−1b makes the
present oracle perform the exact same map as the one
in the previous section, both in the computational and
phase basis. The same analysis as in Section 4.5 now fol-
lows, and the measurement will reveal that the function
was not balanced (an−1 = 0 gives zero output) or not
constant (an−1 = 1 gives nonzero output). We have the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.2: There is an efficient QSL algorithm that
solves the original Deutsch-Jozsa problem by a sin-
gle query to the oracle. This algorithm has an efficient
simulation on a classical probabilistic Turing machine.
That the simulation is efficient relative to the oracle
follows from Lemma 2.1.
4.7 Query complexity
The standard analysis of the Deutsch-Jozsa prob-
lem states that if we only have access to the function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, then it cannot be solved with
unit probability using less than an exponential number of
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queries. This is usually taken as evidence that the prob-
lem is not in P. More carefully put, this is evidence that
relative to this particular oracle, the problem is not in P.
If we accept a solution with a bounded error-probability
then, relative to the same oracle, the problem is in BPP
[10].
Quantum computation allows us to solve the problem
using only O(1) queries, so that relative to a quantum
oracle the problem is in BQP. However, the quantum or-
acle is different, since the function is encoded in a much
richer framework — as a transformation of the compu-
tational basis of a quantum system composed of qubits.
Using this richer framework we can choose to extract
additional information not available in the regular query
model, and it is this information that allows us to solve
the problem using only O(1) queries. Relative to this
richer oracle, the problem is in BQP.
Note that, relative to an oracle in QSL, the
Deutsch-Jozsa problem can be solved with only O(1)
queries. In addition, both the oracle and the Deutsch-
Jozsa algorithm in QSL can be efficiently simulated on
a classical probabilistic Turing machine, so that relative
to an oracle in QSL, the Deutsch-Jozsa problem is in
BPP. In this particular case, there is no quantum ad-
vantage in terms of query complexity.
Furthermore, the ideal quantum algorithm solves the
Deutsch-Jozsa problem with unit probability, so a
more precise characterization is to put the problem into
EQP. The QSL algorithm also provides the solution with
unit probability, and in fact it provides it deterministi-
cally. It is even the case that the randomness present in
the framework never contributes to the computation in
the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm, i.e., the random values
can be replaced with a fixed value without interfering
with the result. Combining this with Lemma 2.1, we see
that, relative to the QSL-oracles, the problem is in P.
5 Oracles as a Comparison
The fact that the quantum query model possesses much
richer quantum oracles than standard classical binary-
input binary-output function oracles, puts doubt in the
standard comparison between the two. The richness of
the quantum oracle really calls for a comparison with a
correspondingly rich classical framework in which oracles
are able to encode the function in one subpart of the sys-
tem, akin to the computational basis, and encode some
additional function in another subpart of the system,
akin to the phase basis. Any comparison between clas-
sical and quantum query complexity should take place
between these two richer frameworks: one quantum, and
one classical that allows these richer oracles. QSL has
exactly the required properties, and can in turn be effi-
ciently simulated on a classical probabilistic Turing ma-
chine. There are several points to make here.
5.1 The Additional Structure and Con-
straints
Only having access to an oracle that computes a function
from bits to bits is insufficient for quantum computation.
So what are the conditions?
One condition is that the oracle needs to accept
qubits as inputs. This is sound but not sufficient, since
there are many quantum operations that produce the
correct function map, but will not enable quantum com-
putation. One example is an implementation of the func-
tion over a completely phase-mixing channel.
A more precise condition is that the function needs
to be implemented as a unitary operator, but even this is
not enough. The function needs to be implemented as a
reversible function with all auxiliary bits cleared and the
query register restored. Even more important, the uni-
tary operator also needs to preserve the relative phases
cx,y
Uf
(∑
x,y
cx,y |x〉 |y〉
)
=
∑
x,y
cx,y |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 (131)
There are many unitary implementations encoding
the function in the computational basis for which the
algorithm does not work. One example is the unitary
given by
U ′f
(∑
x,y
cx,y |x〉 |y〉
)
=
∑
x,y
cx,y(−1)f(x) |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉
(132)
for which the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm will answer
“constant” — for all Boolean functions — with unit prob-
ability [14]. Another example is the unitary
U ′′f
(∑
x,y
cx,y |x〉 |y〉
)
=
∑
x,y
cx,y(−1)x0+f(x) |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 ,
(133)
for which the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm will answer
“balanced” — for all Boolean functions — with unit
probability. There are exponentially many unitaries of
this kind. Still, for all these examples, the function map
is available and the oracle can still be used to solve the
problem using the classical query algorithm.
A similar observation has been made in Machta [58].
In fact, most unitary implementations of f will not work
for the algorithm since, in general, we can have an addi-
tion of (−1)g(x,y) to the relative phases, where g(x, y) is
an arbitrary function not necessarily related to f .
Underneath the compact requirement that the func-
tion should be implemented as the specific unitary
Uf |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 lurks an exponential number
of constraints: the preservation of an exponential num-
ber of complex amplitudes. This is the source of the
richness of quantum oracles: the phase constraints enable
access to much more information than can be accessed
with the standard classical binary-input binary-output
function oracle. Only under these phase constraints it is
possible to retrieve information otherwise not available
from the phase degree of freedom, which in turn is useful
for a more efficient solution of the problem under study.
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5.2 Is the Black-Box Black?
The above difference between quantum oracles and clas-
sical oracles that only gives us access to function values,
puts into question whether they can be used in a justified
comparison. The broader non-black-box definition offers
a good analogy. In this case, a quantum oracle should be
described as a gray-box model; we have partial knowl-
edge about the underlying model generating the statis-
tics, rather than only getting access to the statistics.
Remember the example in Section 1 where a gray-
box model is used in relation to cryptography. There, in
addition to knowing the function map of the protocol,
we also know that it has a physical implementation in
some electrical circuit, but we do not know everything
that there is to know about the box. In this model,
which includes a physical description, side channels be-
come available, e.g., as information leakage through the
power consumption of the circuit. In cryptography, a
protocol is not considered broken if there is a specific
implementation that leaks the secret, which might oth-
erwise be hard to compute. Such a comparison would be
unjustified.
In quantum query complexity, the oracle also comes
with a physical description, namely, it needs to be im-
plemented as one specific unitary, modulo global phase.
Only then will the additional information be available. It
is not available from where we usually read out the value
of the function, i.e., in the computational basis. Instead,
it is available as phase information, in another physi-
cal degree of freedom, constituting a side channel that
allows us to access the extra information that enables
the speed-up. In quantum computing this side effect
is systematically used to efficiently solve computational
problems that are normally not efficiently solvable. This
gives a direct comparison between solving computational
problems in quantum computers, and breaking a crypto-
graphic device through a side channel.
5.3 Assumptions in the Use of Oracles
Let us now briefly return to the definitions of Section 1.2,
and note some differences to the use of the oracle notion
in classical algorithms, quantum algorithms, and QSL
algorithms. In query complexity, an oracle is defined by
what operation it performs, having very few other prop-
erties, and then all statements that are made are relative
to that oracle. Informally the question is: if the oracle
can be computed in a single time step, what problems
could then be solved with a given amount of resources?
In classical query complexity the oracle computes the
function and the standard definition is that of a black
box, i.e., there are no other properties to declare. Rela-
tive to such an oracle the Deutsch-Jozsa problem can-
not be solved deterministically in polynomial time. In
reversible classical logic the standard oracle definition is
that of a black box that adds the result to a target bit
(see Section 1.2). Also relative to such an oracle the
Deutsch-Jozsa problem cannot be solved determinis-
tically in polynomial time.
In quantum query complexity the oracle is defined as
a unitary transformation computing the function. This
gives a not-quite black box, because this adds the prop-
erty of a specific relation between the relative phases
within the output states. Given such an oracle the
Deutsch-Jozsa problem can be solved with a single
query. The justification for the interest in quantum
query complexity is that quantum theory predicts that
these oracles exist and can hypothetically be built.
Finally, in QSL the oracle is defined as a reversible
transformation computing the function, also adding the
property of a specific relation between the relative phases
in the phase-basis output. Given such an oracle the
Deutsch-Jozsa problem can be solved with a single
query. The justification for the interest in QSL query
complexity is that QSL predicts that these oracles exist,
in fact giving an explicit simulation in a classical proba-
bilistic Turing machine.
In classical versus quantum oracle separations the
assumption is that classical oracles cannot encode any
other information than the function. QSL serves as an
example that if we just slightly modify the classical re-
versible model, then we do get classically simulatable
oracles that systematically encode other information.
5.4 Systematic Phase Errors
The additional information that we can choose to re-
trieve from a quantum circuit, and that sometimes can
be used to solve computational tasks, is related to how
unitary transformations manage relative phases. The in-
formation in the amplitude and in the phase is mutually
unbiased, and QSL handles this by storing them indepen-
dently. A function over the computational bits is always
accompanied by a corresponding function on the phase
bits.
It would be convenient if, for any Boolean function f
over the computational bits, we could have a unique ex-
pression for the effect on the phase bits. Such an expres-
sion would be useful for analyzing the general behavior
of QSL. Unfortunately, different implementation of the
same function will result in different effects on the phase
bits.
As an example, there is another procedure for creat-
ing the GHZ-state using two CNOT -gates rather than
one CNOT and one Toffoli-gate, as in Figure 17. This
construction is shown in Figure 27. It is clear that these
two constructions produce different maps. They give the
same map on the computational bits, but different on
the phase bits. It is not only the maps that are different,
also the probability distributions that we relate to quan-
tum states are as well. To see this, consider the marginal
probability distributions from measuring the least signif-
icant system in the computational basis, and the second
system in the phase basis. Doing this with the construc-
tion in Figure 17, we end up with a state represented by a
probability distribution that has 0 bits of entropy, as we
have seen above. On the other hand, doing the same for
the construction in Figure 27, using two CNOT -gates,
the output state will have one bit of entropy.
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|0〉 H
|0〉
|0〉
∼
0 x
x y ⊕ z
0 x
y y
0 x
z z
Figure 27: Another construction that produces a GHZ-
state, and the analogue construction in QSL.
In other words, simulation of different constructions
of quantum circuits that produce the same function in
the computational basis, does not produce the same ef-
fect on the phase bits. The major inconvenience this
phenomenon brings is of course that we cannot analyze
the general effect of applying a function, but have to re-
sort to specific constructions. If we find a construction
that lets us solve a problem efficiently, similarly as in
quantum theory, there is no guarantee that other con-
structions will work. Conversely, if we fail to find a con-
struction that works, we cannot say that the quantum
algorithm lacks an efficient simulation in QSL. However,
this is similar to what we would expect if we had an im-
plementation of the Toffoli gate with systematic errors,
and this will be clarified in what follows.
The presence of systematic phase errors in a quantum
gate array will influence the side channel enabled by the
preservation of relative phases. Consider the following
Toffoli gate that includes a systematic phase error θ,
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 eiθ
0 0 0 0 0 0 eiθ 0

(134)
or equivalently
5∑
x=0
|x〉〈x|+ eiθ (|6〉〈7|+ |7〉〈6|) . (135)
This unitary will be denoted T˜ . Our aim is to analyze
four different constructions of the balanced function com-
puting the majority of three bits; the function with func-
tion string (11101000). The four constructions are shown
in Figure 28.
The construction in Figure 28A is straightforward,
using four 3-T˜ gates with their target in the answer reg-
ister. If we construct the 3-T˜ gates as in Figure 29, then
the resulting operator will be
3 - T˜ =
13∑
X=0
|x〉〈x|+ eiθ (|14〉〈15|+ |15〉〈14|) . (136)
The unitary implementation of Figure 28A becomes
|x〉 |y〉 7→ (eiθ)f(x) |0〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉, and the Deutsch-
Jozsa algorithm will wrongfully answer constant with
probability∣∣∣∣∣18
8∑
x=0
(eiθ)f(x)(−1)f(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣4− 4eiθ8
∣∣∣∣2 = sin2(θ2
)
.
(137)
With θ = pi/3 the error probability becomes 1/4.
X˜ X˜ X˜ X˜
A. X X
X X
X˜ X˜†
X
B.
X˜ X˜ X˜
C. X X
X X˜ X˜
D.
Figure 28: Four different quantum circuit implementa-
tions of the same balanced function, computing the ma-
jority MAJ (see Figure 24) of three bits. A. Straightfor-
ward construction using four 3-T˜ gates. B. The majority
is computed in-place in the query register, the answer is
copied out to the answer register, and the intermedi-
ate step is then uncomputed by applying MAJ† to the
query register. C. is an optimization of A. tuned for
as few gates as possible, and D. is another optimized
for few Toffolis followed by few CNOT s. It was gen-
erated together with all 72 possible functions found in
Appendix A.
|0〉 X˜ X˜†
X˜
=
X˜
Figure 29: Scheme for constructing a 3-T˜ from three
T˜ gates with an systematic error and an ancillary qubit
initiated in |0〉.
The construction in Figure 28B uses an intermediate
step to compute the majority in-place, using the MAJ-
gate shown in Figure 24, adding the result to the out-
put, and then uncomputing the intermediate result by
applying MAJ†. With this construction, the Deutsch-
Jozsa algorithm will (correctly) answer balanced with
unit probability even though there is a phase error in
the T˜ gate.
This reproduces the behavior of QSL, where using
the QSL-Toffoli gives an error probability 1/4 when the
oracle is constructed as in Figure 28A, and zero error
probability if constructed as in Figure 28B. The calcula-
tions can be found in Appendix B.
With the quantum circuit in Figure 28C the error
probability becomes∣∣∣∣4− 3eiθ − ei3θ8
∣∣∣∣2 , (138)
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and for Figure 28D ∣∣∣∣1− ei2θ8
∣∣∣∣2 , (139)
and again, if θ = pi/3 these become 19/64 and 1/64 re-
spectively. In QSL, only the three random bits going into
the query register is taking part in the simulation. There-
fore, any probability distribution describing the outcome
can only be resolved into fractions of 8. The best approx-
imations we can obtain for 19/64 and 1/64 is then 1/4
and 0 respectively. This is exactly the error probability
that we see in QSL (see Appendix B).
Perhaps it is important to stress that the QSL-Toffoli
is not a quantum Toffoli with a systematic error. It is a
simulation of a quantum Toffoli that uses classical bits
in the simulation. What we have seen here is that the
QSL-Toffoli behaves similarly to a quantum Toffoli gate
with systematic error, giving similar variations in output
statistics for different constructions of the same function.
5.5 Starting with Something Else Than
Access to an Oracle
It may also be argued that if we start from something
else than access to an oracle, for instance a circuit im-
plementation, it might be hard to translate that into
QSL. The question is why this would be considered an
argument at all. In the problems under study, there are
simply too many possible functions to convey an explicit
construction to the solver of the problem. For example,
in the case of an explicit function from the Deutsch-
Jozsa problem, the number of balanced functions grows
as
√
22n , so that simply indexing the explicit construc-
tions would require an exponential amount of informa-
tion. How would it be possible to convey the explicit
construction to the solver in this case? If successful, the
solver will have received an exponential amount of infor-
mation in the transfer.
One possibility to make the problem practical is to
restrict the problem to a polynomial-sized subset of all
balanced functions, but this would be a severe alteration
of the problem formulation, and then there is no reason
to believe that the proof of separation still applies. The
simplification to a polynomial-sized subset may enable a
polynomial-time solution even in a classical Turing ma-
chine, and it is even possible to argue that this is likely
the case.
In addition to this, given an explicit construction, for
example in the form of a circuit or a procedure, it may
well be that the structure of the explicit construction
gives the solution away, the most clear example of this
in quantum computation is the standard construction of
the Bernstein-Vazirani oracle that can be found in
Figure 20. In the case that the solution cannot be found
by inspection, the extraction of the solution from the
structure would constitute a field of research in its own
right. — and with the interpretation of the extra infor-
mation as a side channel, it could even be argued that
quantum computation is part of that field of research.
The above complications is the basic motivation to
use the black-box query model in the first place. In the
remainder of the paper, we will use the query model to
investigate how QSL performs in two additional quan-
tum algorithms: Grover’s algorithm and Simon’s al-
gorithm. We will also have a look at a real-world algo-
rithm, Shor’s algorithm, where construction of the gate
array is polynomial-time, and study the behavior of QSL
in this situation.
6 Grover’s Algorithm
Given a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
Grover’s algorithm [59] is a probabilistic algorithm
that returns an element of the preimage of f(x) = 1.
That is, it returns with high probability a satisfying as-
signment to f , if there is one. This algorithm can be
used to solve the decision problem of answering whether
f has a satisfying assignment or not.
If we have no knowledge about the function, and we
are only given oracle access to it, we must resort to using
exhaustive search — simply querying the function for all
inputs until we find a 1 or not. This will in the worst
case require O(2n) queries. The best guess a probabilis-
tic algorithm can use, without any knowledge about the
function, is to pick an input uniformly at random. This
will also require O(2n) queries to solve with a bounded
error-probability. Both of these estimates rely on the
black-box nature of the function provided, because if the
function gate array is available, it may be trivial to find
the satisfying assignment, see for example Figure 31.
The quantum algorithm proceeds as follows, and only
requires O(√2n) queries to solve the problem with a
bounded error-probability.
Algorithm 6.1: (Grover [59]) After performing
a Walsh-Hadamard transform on the initial state
|0〉⊗n |1〉, repeat the following steps √2n times.
1. Apply the oracle
2. Perform a Walsh-Hadamard transform of the
query register
3. Apply (I − 2 |0〉〈0|) to the query register. This
is an n-controlled-Z with all controls inverted
(including the target Z).
4. Perform a Walsh-Hadamard transform of the
query register
Then measure the query register, which will give
you the satisfying assignment with high probability
(see further [30]). One repetition of the steps 1-4 is
known as the Grover operator.
6.1 Problem Formulation
Here we will restrict the problem to the worst case sce-
nario, where there is only one satisfying assumption.
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Definition 6.1: Assume that you are given access to an
oracle for the function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and that it
only has one satisfying assignment x∗ : f(x∗) = 1. Find
x∗.
This is the original problem formulation used by
Grover. As usual, for the quantum case the quantum
oracle is assumed to be encoded as a unitary function
from qubits to qubits, and not as a Boolean function
from bits to bits.
6.2 One-Shot Grover
We will start with a small example which is sometimes
called One-shot Grover. This is the case where there
are two qubits in the query register1 and the Grover op-
erator only need to be applied once (see Figure 30).
|0〉 H Uf H H
|0〉 H H H
|1〉 H
Uf
Figure 30: Circuit for the one-shot Grover instance.
Since Uf |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉, it is straightforward
to check that
Uf |x+〉 = |x+〉 , (140)
and
Uf |x−〉 =
{
− |x−〉 , if x = x∗
+ |x−〉 , otherwise. (141)
This is another example of phase kick-back. From lin-
earity we obtain
Uf = I ⊗ |+〉 〈+|+ (I − 2 |x∗〉 〈x∗|)⊗ |−〉 〈−| . (142)
The combination of steps 2, 3, and 4 is sometimes called
“inversion over the mean”, and can be written
A = H⊗2(I−2 |00〉〈00|)H⊗2 = (I−2 |++〉〈++|) (143)
The quantum algorithm proceeds as follows
|00〉 |1〉 H
⊗3
−−−→ |++〉 |−〉
Uf−−→ (|++〉 − |x∗〉) |−〉
A⊗I−−−→ (− |++〉 − (|x∗〉 − |++〉) ) |−〉
= − |x∗〉 |−〉 ,
(144)
so that a measurement of the query register will reveal
x∗ with unit probability.
To see how this works in QSL we need to find an ex-
pression for the oracle. For n = 2 there are four functions
with a single satisfying assignment
f(x) = x1 x0,
f(x) = x1x0,
f(x) = x1x0, and
f(x) = x1x0.
(145)
The canonical constructions for these are to use the four
different Toffoli gates with different combinations of reg-
ular and inverted controls. Let us take the example
where f(x) = x1x0. Here x∗ = (01) and the resulting
quantum circuit is shown in Figure 31.
|0〉 H H H
|0〉 H H H
|1〉 H
Figure 31: Example circuit of the one-shot Grover
where f(x) = x1x0.
The operation A (“inversion over the mean”) would be
(x1, p1) (x2, p2)
H×2−−−→ (p1, x1) (p2, x2)
CZ00−−−→ (p1, x1 ⊕ p2) (p2, x2 ⊕ p1)
H×2−−−→ (x1 ⊕ p2, p1) (x2 ⊕ p1, p2).
(146)
The complete algorithm becomes
(0, r1) (0, r0) (1, rt)
H×3−−−→ (r1, 0) (r0, 0) (rt, 1)
Of−−→ (r1, r0) (r0, r1)
(
rt ⊕ f(r), 1
)
A×I−−−→ (r1 ⊕ r1, r0) (r0 ⊕ r0, r1)
(
rt ⊕ f(r), 1
)
= (0, r0) (1, r1)
(
rt ⊕ f(r), 1
)
(147)
Measurement of the query register will reveal x∗ = (01)
(see Figure 32). This will be true also for the other three
functions as well, and we will return to show this later
on.
0 0
r1 r0
0 1
r0 r1
1 rt ⊕ f(r)
rt 1
Figure 32: QSL simulation of the one-shot Grover in-
stance from Figure 31.
6.3 The n-Toffoli
To extend this to larger systems we need a description
of the simulation of an n-Toffoli. For a quantum 3-qubit
Toffoli we have the identity of Figure 33.
1In general, the requirement for a ”one-shot” Grover is that 1/4 of the input states are satisfying assignments.
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|0〉 X X |0〉
X
=
X
Figure 33: Scheme for construction a 3-Toffoli from
three regular Toffoli gates and an ancillary qubit initi-
ated in |0〉.
We see that the corresponding QSL map is
(x2, p2) (x2, p2 ⊕ tpx0x1)
(x1, p1) (x1, p1 ⊕ tpx0x2)
(0, a1) 7→ (0, a1)
(x0, p0) (x0, p0 ⊕ tpx1x2)
(tx, tp) (tx ⊕ x0x1x2, tp),
(148)
which in QSL gives the relation shown in Figure 34.
X
∼
Figure 34: QSL identity for the 3-Toffoli
Now using the same identity but by extending the
3-Toffoli to a 4-Toffoli (Figure 35) we get the map
(x3, p3)
(x2, p2)
(0, a1)
(x1, p1)
(x0, p0)
(tx, tp)
7→
(x3, p3 ⊕ tpx0x1x2)
(x2, p2 ⊕ tpx0x1x3)
(0, a1)
(x1, p1 ⊕ tpx0x2x3)
(x0, p0 ⊕ tpx1x2x3)
(tx ⊕ x0x1x2x3, tp).
(149)
|0〉 X X |0〉
X
=
X
Figure 35: Scheme for construction a 4-Toffoli from
one 3-Toffoli, two regular Toffoli gates, and an ancillary
qubit initiated in |0〉.
By induction, we see that in QSL the map corresponding
to an n-Toffoli is
(xn, pn)
(
xn, pn ⊕ tp
( ∏
k 6=n
xk
))
...
...
(x1, p1)
7→ (
x1, p1 ⊕ tp
(∏
k 6=1
xk
))
(x0, p0)
(
x0, p0 ⊕ tp
(∏
k 6=0
xk
))
(tx, tp)
(
tx ⊕
(∏
k
xk
)
, tp
)
(150)
Using inverted controls by putting X before and af-
ter the control that is to be inverted, we see that this
will not influence the value of the computational bits in
the query register. The computational bit of the target
and the phase bits of the query register will be affected,
as the added X will induce the bit-complement for the
corresponding xi. With f as the function with only one
satisfying assignment x∗,
f(x) =
∏
k
(
xk ⊕ x∗k
)
, (151)
built using a single n-Toffoli with some controls inverted,
gives the QSL mapping
(x, p) (tx, tp) 7→
(
x, p⊕ tpf˜(x)
) (
tx ⊕ f(x), tp
)
. (152)
Here
f˜i(x) =
∏
k 6=i
(
xk ⊕ x∗k
)
= f
(∑
k 6=i
2kxk + 2ix∗i
)
, (153)
so to speak, the function with the ith bit of the argument
set to the correct value of the satisfying assignment x∗i .
6.4 A Scaling Algorithm
When increasing the number of input-bits the algorithm
will have us to apply the Grover operator several times
in sequence before measuring. A QSL simulation of this
will not behave as the quantum algorithm, and we have
found that the behavior is too far from the quantum
behavior to give the quadratic speed-up of Grover’s
algorithm. The underlying reason for this lack of speed-
up needs more study, but we have found that simulating
only the first application of the Grover operator gives a
logarithmic speed-up, and this would give the following
QSL algorithm.
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Algorithm 6.2: Repeat the following steps O ( 2nn )
times
1. Prepare an n-QSL-bit query register in the
(0, r) state, and an answer register containing
one QSL-bit in the (1, ry) state.
2. Apply a Walsh-Hadamard transform on the
query register
3. Apply the oracle
4. Apply a Walsh-Hadamard transform on the
query register
5. Apply X×n to the query register.
6. Apply an n-controlled Z to the query register.
7. Apply X×n to the query register.
8. Apply a Walsh-Hadamard transform on the
query register
9. Measure the query register to obtain a candi-
date y for x∗.
Check the output candidates for x∗ using the oracle,
and return the candidate that outputs 1, if any.
The algorithm applies the Grover operator only once
and measures immediately, and then proceeds to re-
peat this sequence, whereas standard Grover applies the
Grover operator repeatedly, followed by a single mea-
surement. Using our description of the n-Toffoli, we can
now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1: Algorithm 6.2 solves Grovers problem
with a bounded error probability using no more than
O ( 2nn ) number of queries to the oracle.
Proof. Let us start by calculating the probability distri-
bution from which the measurement samples.
The first four steps of the algorithm produces
(0, r) (1, rt) 7→
(
f˜(r), r
) (
rt ⊕ f(r), 1
)
. (154)
Applying steps five, six, and seven will have the equiva-
lent effect on the query register as applying another n-
Toffoli with all controls inverted, on a target system with
the phase bit set. This corresponds to applying another
Boolean function
g(x) =
∏
i
xi. (155)
The effect on the query register is(
f˜(r), r
) 7→ (f˜(r), r ⊕ g˜(f˜(r))), (156)
where g˜i is similar to f˜i, so that g˜i is g with the correct
bit value used in position i (here 0, the satisfying assign-
ment of g). Measuring after the final Walsh-Hadamard
transform we sample from the bitwise distribution
yi = ri ⊕
(∏
k 6=i
f˜k(r)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g˜i(f˜(r))
(157)
where r is the whole random bit string, i the bit index,
and f˜k the different functions described above. Let us
split the analysis into three cases
1. If r = x∗, all f˜i(r) = 1, and all g˜i = 0, so that the
output is r = x∗.
2. If rk = x∗k except for a single ri 6= x∗i (r has a
Hamming distance of 1 to x∗), then f˜k(r) = δik
since f˜i(r) uses the correct value x∗i in place of ri,
while f˜k(r) = 0 for k 6= i since the wrong bit-value
ri is being used throughout. This in turn gives
g˜k
(
f˜(r)
)
= δik by the same mechanism (the satis-
fying assignment of g is all-zero values). Then, the
output r ⊕ g˜(f˜(r)) = r ⊕ δik = x∗.
3. When two or more bits are wrong, all f˜k(r) = 0,
and all g˜i = 1. This will give as output the bitwise
complement r, which is not equal to x∗ except for
when all bits are wrong, in which case r = x∗.
In short, we can think of this as a protocol where
a random guess r is corrected to x∗ if there is a sin-
gle bit error in r, or if r is the bitwise complement of
x∗. The sampling distribution therefore has a probability
p = n+22n of obtaining x∗, probability p = 0 for obtaining
the bitwise complement x∗ or a bitstring with Hamming
distance of 1 to x∗, and probability p = 12n for any other
value. Repeating the subroutine κ2n/(n+ 2) = O(2n/n)
times gives a probability of not obtaining x∗ even once
less than e−κ (Theorem 5 of [59]).
An alternative is to repeat the subroutine until the
first occurrence of x∗. This gives a solution to the prob-
lem with error probability 0, but instead gives a random
number of trials that obeys the shifted geometric distri-
bution with probability (n+2)/2n of obtaining x∗. Then,
the expected number of subroutine calls to the first suc-
cess is 2n/(n + 2), so that the expected number of calls
to the oracle including checking if the output y = x∗ is
2n+1/(n+ 2) = O(2n/n).
To connect with the fist example of one-shot
Grover’s for when n = 2. There is a total of four as-
signments, one correct, its bitwise complement, and two
strings with one bit difference. The QSL simulation will
therefore always return the correct assignment for the
one-shot Grover’s.
6.5 Comparison with a 3-qubit Experi-
ment
For three bit input, running the protocol once, as in the
above proposal, is a simulation of the setup used in a
recent 3-qubit Grover experiment on trapped ions by
Figgatt et al. [60]. The authors use two measures to
34
characterize this experiment, the success probability of
the algorithm and the squared statistical overlap (SSO).
The SSO is the square of the Bhattacharyya coefficient
(see Equation (26)) between the estimated probability
distribution that the experiment samples from and the
theoretical distribution.
While Figgatt et al. obtain an average SSO of
83.2(7)%, our simulation gives 78.5%, which is slightly
lower. On the other hand, their average success probabil-
ity is 38.9(4)%, while our simulation of the same circuitry
has a success probability of 5/8 = 62.5%, much closer to
the theoretical 25/32 ≈ 78.1%. It is important to note
that when we compare quantum and classical bounds for
some problem, we compare the best known bounds — of
course including simulation algorithms.
6.6 Application to Ciphers
An application of Grover’s algorithm gives a quadratic
speed-up to breaking most ciphers for which otherwise
exhaustive search is the best-known method. Let us have
a closer look at how that works.
Let us suppose that Alice has a classical system that
uses a bijective map described by the function E(k,m) =
c, that takes as arguments a plaintext message m, a key
k, and produces a ciphertext c. Alice uses this function
to encrypt information and its inversion (as a map from
m to c) to decrypt. When the same key k is used both
for encryption and decryption this is called a symmetric
cipher, and when not, an asymmetric cipher.
An attack that uses Grover’s algorithm is a known-
plain-text attack. In such an attack, Eve possesses (or
can obtain) both the plaintext and the corresponding ci-
phertext produced with Alice’s key. Let us for simplicity
assume that the length of the known plaintext is longer
than the unicity length, meaning it is long enough so
that the key is uniquely determined by E, m, and c.
To retrieve k, Eve also needs to know E. That she has
in her possession a copy of Alice’s system, or a schematic,
can be justified with Kerckhoff’s principle stating that a
secure cryptographic system should remain secure un-
der the assumption that an adversary knows everything
about the cryptographic system, except for the key.
Now assume that it is possible for Eve to efficiently
translate Alice’s classical device into a quantum device,
and that this process does not give her any information
about the key. Then she can set up her system to en-
crypt |m〉 and add 1 to a second register, conditioned on
seeing |c〉 (see Figure 36). This unitary can now be used
to find k in O(√2n) time using Grover’s algorithm.
We conjecture that this attack can be done within
the QSL framework. However, it remains to be analyzed
for which specific cases this does work since the behav-
ior depends on the implementation. Also, note that the
advantage from the above algorithm is smaller, only the
factor 1/n in O(2n/n).
|k〉 /n |k〉
|m〉 /l Ek c E†k |m〉
|0〉 X |f(k)〉
Figure 36: Circuit construction for using Grover’s
algorithm to perform a known plaintext attack on a sy-
metric cipher Ek, where the key k has a bitsize of n and
the known plaintext a bitsize of l. The control labeled c
expresses that X is applied only if the output of Ek|m〉
is |c〉, inverting the target bit. This can be constructed
with an l-Toffoli with regular and inverted controlls.
7 Simon’s Algorithm
Simon’s problem [15, 16] is the archetype of quantum
exponential speed-up, as the first case of a relativized
exponential gap between BPP and BQP. Its method
has been reused and generalized many times over, and
was the inspiration for Shor’s algorithm [17, 18].
7.1 Problem Formulation
We will work from the following problem formulation
Definition 7.1: Consider that we are given access to
an oracle encoding a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and
promised that it is either one-to-one or two-to-one and
invariant under a non-trivial XOR-mask s.
A function being invariant under a non-trivial XOR-
mask s means that the function f yield the same output
on two different inputs, x and x′, only if these two input
differs exactly on those bit positions where the bits of
the mask s are 1. In other words, f(x) = f(x′) if and
only if x = x′ ⊕ s.
7.2 Probabilistic Solution
Assuming that we only have access to an oracle that only
gives us the output of the function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
Simon proved the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1: (Simon [15, 16]) Let O be an oracle
constructed as follows: for each n, a random n-bit string
s(n) and a random bit b(n) are uniformly chosen from
{0, 1}n and {0, 1}, respectively. If b(n) = 0, then the
function fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n chosen for O to com-
pute on n-bit queries is a random function uniformly
distributed over permutations on {0, 1}n; otherwise, it
is a random function uniformly distributed over two-to-
one functions such that fn(x) = fn(x ⊕ s(n)) for all x,
where ⊕ denotes bitwise exclusive-or. Then any PTM
that queries O no more than 2n/4times cannot correctly
guess b(n) with probability greater than (1/2) + 2−n/2,
over choices made in the construction of O.
The proof can be found in Ref. [16], here we will in-
stead give a simple motivation as to why this will require
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an exponential number of queries. Consider an algorithm
that queries the oracle on random inputs. If the algo-
rithm finds the same function value twice it halts, and
we can conclude that the function is two-to-one and in-
variant under some XOR-mask s. Now, if the queries are
chosen from a uniform distribution (there is no point in
choosing input from another distribution since s is cho-
sen uniformly) the range of the function can also be seen
as a probability distribution. If the function is one-to-one
it will be uniform. If the function is instead two-to-one,
half of the sample space will have p = 0 and the rest will
be uniformly distributed with p = 22n . It is therefore un-
likely that an algorithm using less than an exponential
number of queries will see the same value twice.
7.3 Quantum Algorithm
Let us now assume that we are given access to an oracle
that encodes the function in the unitary transformation
|x〉 |y〉 Uf−−→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 . (158)
Simon’s algorithm can then make use of the subrou-
tine shown in Figure 37 and proceed as follows
|0〉 |0〉 H
⊗n⊗I⊗n−−−−−−−→ 12n/2
∑
x
|x〉 |0〉
Uf−−→ 12n/2
∑
x
|x〉 |f(x)〉
H⊗n⊗I⊗n−−−−−−−→ 12n−b/2
∑
x,p
(−1)x·p |p〉 |f(x)〉 ,
(159)
where the scalar product is defined mod 2. The nor-
malization constant on the last row depends on whether
f is one-to-one (b = 0) or two-to-one (b = 1), and the
difference is because of subtractive interference in the
two-to-one case, see below.
If the function is one-to-one, measuring the query
register will yield an outcome p drawn from a uniform
distribution. If the function is two-to-one there will be
destructive interference so that some terms cancel in the
sum, and using f(x) = f(x⊕s) the output can be written
1
2n−1/2
∑
x,p
(−1)x·p |p〉 |f(x)〉
= 12n+1/2
∑
x,p
(−1)x·p |p〉 ( |f(x)〉+ |f(x⊕ s)〉 )
= 12n+1/2
∑
x,p
(
(−1)x·p + (−1)(x⊕s)·p) |p〉 |f(x)〉
= 12n+1/2
∑
x,p
(−1)x·p(1 + (−1)s·p) |p〉 |f(x)〉
= 12n−1/2
∑
x,p:s·p=0
(−1)x·p |p〉 |f(x)〉
(160)
This will yield an outcome drawn from a distribution
that is uniform over values p such that s · p = 0.
Each call to the subroutine gives independent out-
comes so after an expected linear number of rounds, we
will have collected n−1 linearly independent bit-vectors.
Solving the resulting linear system of equations will give
a non-trivial solution s∗ that will be our candidate for
s. If the function is one-to-one, s∗ will be a random
bit-vector. By using s∗ to query the function twice, for
f(x) and f(x⊕ s∗) for some x, we obtain the solution to
the problem. If the function is two-to-one and invariant
under the XOR-mask s∗, the two queries will yield the
same result, otherwise not.
|0〉 /n H⊗n Uf H⊗n
|0〉 /n
Uf
Figure 37: Quantum circuit used as a subroutine in Si-
mon’s algorithm. The subroutine assumes oracle access
to Uf .
Algorithm 7.1: (Simon [15, 16]) Proceed with
the following steps.
1. Make n−1 repetitions of Subroutine (7.1) (also
shown in Figure 37). This will with high prob-
ability yield n − 1 linearly independent bit-
vectors orthogonal to s.
2. Solve the resulting linear system of equations
to obtain the candidate solution s∗
3. Query the function for f(x) and f(x⊕ s∗), for
some x.
If the two queries gives the same value, then the
function is two-to-one and invariant under the XOR-
mask s = s∗, and otherwise not.
Subroutine 7.1: (Simon [15, 16]) Proceed with
the following steps.
1. Prepare two n-qubit registers in the state |0〉.
2. Apply the Walsh-Hadamard transform to the
query register.
3. Apply the oracle.
4. Apply the Walsh-Hadamard transform to the
query register.
5. Measure the query register to retrieve a bit-
vector p.
Return p.
7.4 QSL Simulation
Theorem 7.1 does of course not apply to the quantum
case where the function oracle is given as a unitary map
with n qubits as input and n qubits as target, and not a
function from n bits to n bits. Neither does it apply to
the QSL framework since the oracle is a map that uses
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n QSL-bits as input and n QSL-bits as target, or if one
prefers, from 2n bits to 2n bits in its classical simulation.
The base construct that we will use for Simon’s sub-
routine is that used in Tame et al. [61] (see their supple-
mentary material) and consists of a network of CNOT
gates. It is generated by choosing a basis {v(k)}n−2k=0 for a
(perhaps the) subspace of Zn2 orthogonal to s, and stor-
ing the scalar product between the input x and v(k) in
the k-th bit of the output y. This is done by connecting
a CNOT between the input bit xi and the output bit yk
for each entry where v(k)i = 1, producing the mapping
|x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉
∣∣∣y ⊕ f (1)(x)〉 (161)
where
f
(1)
k (x) =
{
0, k = n− 1
x · v(k) = (x⊕ s) · v(k), otherwise. (162)
The resulting function f (1)(x) is a two-to-one function
invariant under the XOR-mask s. We label the resulting
gate array Us.
As an example consider the 3-qubit case where
s = (101). the bit-vector basis can be chosen to
{(101), (010)}. From v(0) = (101) we get two CNOTs
with their controls at |x0〉 and |x2〉, and target at |y0〉.
From v(1) = (010) a CNOT with control at |x1〉 and
target at |y1〉 (see Figure 38).
|x2〉
|x1〉
|x0〉
|y2〉
|y1〉 X
|y0〉 X X
Us=(101)
Figure 38: Example construction for Us, where s =
(101) and {v(k)}1k=0 = {(101), (010)}.
For the one-to-one maps, we add a map Vs that uses
a final vector v(n−1) needed to complete the basis to a
basis for the whole Zn2 . Since we can choose any vector
not orthogonal to s, we simply pick a vector with a single
bit set out of the bits set in s (which is possible as soon
as s 6= 0). To construct Vx, connect a CNOT from xi to
yn−1 for the single v(n−1)i = 1. This gives the map
|x〉
∣∣∣f (1)(x)〉 7→ |x〉 ∣∣∣y ⊕ f (0)(x)〉 (163)
where
f
(0)
k (x) = x · v(k) (164)
This equals f (1)k except for the case k = n− 1 for which
f
(0)
n−1(x⊕ s) = (x⊕ s) · v(n−1) = f (0)n−1(x), (165)
making f (0)(x) a one-to-one function.
The complete construction is shown in Figure 39 and
consists of three parts: the Us map, the Vs map con-
trolled by a bit b that decides if f is one-to-one or two-
to-one, and a permutation like the one used in Section 4.
b
|x〉 /n |x〉
|0〉 /n ⊕ pif |f(x)〉Us Vs
Figure 39: Oracle construction for Simon’s Subrou-
tine.
Creating a controlled Vs consists simply of exchang-
ing the single CNOT with a single Toffoli with the sec-
ond inverted control attached to the control bit b, giv-
ing the map f (1)(x) 7→ f (b)(x). To produce all pos-
sible one-to-one and two-to-one functions of this type
from f (b)(x), the output needs to be fed into an arbi-
trary permutation pif (of the number states) which makes
pif (f (b)(x)) = f(x). Note that if the function is two-
to-one, the permutation will preserve the invariance un-
der addition of s. Also note that the use of a generic
permutation prohibits a general |y〉 to be used since
pif
(
y ⊕ f ′(x)) does not necessarily equal y ⊕ pif(f ′(x)),
thus the use of y = 0 in the construction. For a general
y, see Section 7.5.
The overall implementation of the oracle will give
|x〉 |0〉 Uf−−→ |x〉
∣∣∣pif(f (b)(x))〉 = |x〉 |f(x)〉 . (166)
Next we need to find out how this behaves in QSL.
Each CNOT gives a phase kick-back to the controlling
QSL-bit, and there is a CNOT between input QSL-bit xi
and the output QSL-bit yk for each entry where v(k)i = 1.
Therefore, for each phase bit ck set in the output, the
corresponding v(k) is added to the phase of the input.
The total effect of Us is to add
g(1)(c) =
n−2∑
k=0
ckv
(k) (mod 2) (167)
to the phase of x, while Vs adds cn−1v(n−1) if enabled,
creating
g(0)(c) =
n−1∑
k=0
ckv
(k) (mod 2). (168)
Omitting the control system (b, a) (but including a
nonzero target y), the effect of the QSL oracle is
(x, p) (y, c) Us−→ (x, a⊕ g(1)(c)) (y ⊕ f (1)(x), c)
CVs−−→ (x, a⊕ g(b)(c)) (y ⊕ f (b)(x), c)
pif−−→ (x, a⊕ g(b)(c)) (pif(y ⊕ f (b)(x)), pif,y⊕f(b)(x)(c)),
(169)
where the phase permutation notation from Equa-
tion (123) becomes the somewhat cumbersome
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pif,y⊕f(b)(x)(c). Using this to simulate the entire sub-
routine in Figure 37, we get
(0, r) (0, r′) H×I−−−→ (r, 0) (0, r′)
Of−−→ (r, g(b)(r′)) (f(r), pif,f(b)(r)(r′))
H×I−−−→ (g(b)(r′), r) (f(r), pif,f(b)(r)(r′))
(170)
Measuring the query register will yield g(b)(r′), that is a
linear combination of vectors v(k) with r′k as coefficients.
The state preparation in each round of the subroutine
creates independent and uniformly distributed random
bit vectors r′ (and r). Therefore, if b = 1 the output
will be a random vector uniformly distributed over the
subspace orthogonal to s, and if b = 0 the output is
a random vector uniformly distributed over the entire
Zn2 . Thus, the simulation samples from the same prob-
ability distribution as the quantum algorithm, and will
also solve the decision problem with the same expected
linear number of queries to the oracle as the quantum
algorithm. We have now arrived at
Theorem 7.2: There is an efficient QSL algorithm that
solves Simon’s problem with an expected O(n) number of
queries query to the oracle. Relative to the oracle, this
QSL algorithm has an efficient classical simulation on a
PTM, in accordance with Lemma 2.1.
This shows that, relative to this oracle, the problem
is in BPP.
7.5 Adding the function output to the
target modulo 2
We noted earlier that the oracle in Figure 37 does not
produce a unitary map that adds the function value mod
2 to the output, because of the final number-state permu-
tation. To allow a non-zero-initialized answer register so
that the map becomes |x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉, Bennett’s
trick of uncomputation [26] can be used (see Figure 40).
|b〉
|x〉 /n |x〉
|0〉 /n pif pi†f |0〉
|y〉 /n ⊕ |y ⊕ f(x)〉
Us U†sVs V
†
s
Figure 40: Oracle construction for Simons algorithm
where the output can be initiated in a non-zero state.
The boxed modulo 2 addition denotes an array of
CNOTs that adds each ancilla bit to the corresponding
target bit.
In this case the first three gates (Us, CVs, and pif ) per-
forms the map (only writing what happens in the query
register and ancilla),
(x, p) (0, r)→ (x, p⊕ g(b)(r)) (f(x), pif,f(b)(x)(r)).
(171)
The CNOT array will add the value f(x) to the target
register (y, c) modulo 2 and cause a phase kickback from
the target register,(
x, p⊕ g(b)(r)) (f(x), pif,f(b)(x)(r))
→ (x, p⊕ g(b)(r)) (f(x), pif,f(b)(x)(r)⊕ c). (172)
Finally, letting r′ equal the output of the inverted per-
mutation,
r′ = pi−1
f,f(b)(r)
(
pif,f(b)(x)(r)⊕ c
)
, (173)
the final three gates (pi†f , CV†s, and U†s ) will invert the
function map and cause another addition of g(b) in the
phase of the input system,(
x, p⊕ g(b)(r)) (f(x), pif,f(b)(x)(r)⊕ c)
→ (x, p⊕ g(b)(r)⊕ g(b)(r′)) (0, r′). (174)
When used in Simon’s algorithm, p = 0, and r and c are
independent uniformly distibuted random values, which
make r′ independent of r and uniformly distributed. The
output of the algorithm is the phase of the query register,
which equals
g(b)(r)⊕ g(b)(r′) (175)
As the two arguments to g are independent and randomly
distributed, the sample retrieved from the measurement
will be drawn from the uniform distribution over all bit
strings if b = 0, or the strings orthogonal to s if b = 1.
This gives the same output distribution as the quantum
algorithm, and the theorem holds in this case as well.
7.6 A deterministic algorithm for Si-
mon’s problem
An interesting extension of this algorithm is the one de-
vised by Brassard and Hoyer [62], which relative to an
oracle decides the problem in exact quantum polynomial
time EQP, meaning that the number of calls to the or-
acle is deterministic and polynomial, and that the error
probability is zero. This algorithm was considered rel-
ativized evidence for an exponential separation between
EQP and BPP. In [14] we developed a similar algo-
rithm for the case when the oracle is of the form used in
Section 7.4, or in general, when the bias enters into the
function evaluation as
|x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |fy(x)〉 = |x〉
∣∣∣pif(y ⊕ U0(x⊕ (x · vs)s))〉 ,
(176)
where U0 is a binary orthogonal map (i.e., one-to-one,
and preserves scalar products), vs is a vector with vs·vs =
vs · s = 1 unless s = 0 in which case vs = 0, and pif is
a permutation as before. Note that the construction en-
ables all f(x) = f0(x), and that
(x⊕ s)⊕ ((x⊕ s) · vs)s = x⊕ (x · vs)s, (177)
so that fy(x ⊕ s) = fy(x). The difference to the stan-
dard construction is that bias enters differently, since the
standard construction gives f ′y(x) = y ⊕ f(x).
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|0〉 /n H⊗n Uf H⊗n
|δk〉 /n H⊗n
Uf
Figure 41: Proposed quantum circuit as subroutine
in an algorithm solving Simon’s problem in polynomial
time, both in quantum theory, and in QSL.
The algorithm, as compared to the standard algo-
rithm, adds a Walsh-Hadamard transform on the an-
swer register input, and then simply iterates through
bit-strings δk that have only the kth bit set on the an-
swer register input. A quantum oracle that obeys Equa-
tion (176) will give the following effect in the algorithm,
|0〉 |p〉 H
⊗n⊗H⊗n−−−−−−−→
∑
x,y
(−1)y·p |x〉 |y〉
y⊕U0(...)−−−−−−→
∑
x,y
(−1)y·p |x〉 ∣∣y ⊕ U0(x⊕ (x · vs)s)〉
=
∑
x,y
(−1)
(
y⊕U0(x⊕(x·vs)s)
)
·p |x〉 |y〉
=
∑
x,y
(−1)x·
(
U−10 p⊕(s·U−10 p)vs
)
⊕(y·p) |x〉 |y〉
H⊗n⊗pif−−−−−−→ ∣∣U−10 p⊕ (s · U−10 p)vs〉∑
y
(−1)y·p |pif (y)〉 .
(178)
A measurement on the query register will give the output
U−10 p⊕ (s · U−10 p)vs, which is orthogonal to s because
s·(U−10 p⊕(s·U−10 p)vs) = (s·U−10 p)⊕(s·U−10 p)(s·vs) = 0,
(179)
and the output from letting p iterate over a basis for
bitstrings of length n will span the subspace orthogonal
to s. The important difference to the previous analy-
sis is that the present form preserves orthogonality in
the phase kick-back, whereas there is no such guaran-
tee needed in Section 7.5. It is now easy to check if the
output subspace has dimension n (the n outputs are lin-
early independent) or n − 1. The quantum algorithm
solves the problem with error probability zero in linear
time, so relative to this oracle, this problem is in EQP.
The behavior will be exactly the same for the QSL
simulation, but here we only analyze the explicit choices
U0 = [v(1), v(2), . . . , v(n)]T (180)
and if s 6= 0,
vs = v(n). (181)
This gives us the explicit construction of Section 7.4, for
which
(0, x) (δk, y)
H×n×H×n−−−−−−−→ (x, 0) (y, δk)
Us◦CVs−−−−−→ (x, v(k)) (y ⊕ f (b)(x), δk)
H×n×pif−−−−−−→ (v(k), x) (pif(y ⊕ f (b)(x)), pif,y⊕f(b)(x)(δk)),
(182)
for k ≤ n− 2 and
(0, x) (δn−1, y)
H×n×H×n−−−−−−−→ (x, 0) (y, δn−1)
Us◦CVs−−−−−→ (x, bv(n−1)) (y ⊕ f (b)(x), δn−1)
H×n×pif−−−−−−→ (bv(n−1), x)
×
(
pif
(
y ⊕ f (b)(x)), pif,y⊕f(b)(x)(δn−1)).
(183)
Again, the iteration will produce measurement results
from the query register that span the subspace of bit-
strings v that obey v · bs = 0. The output is exactly
the same as in the quantum case. Thus, relative to this
QSL oracle, this problem is in P. By modifying the ef-
fect of bias on the target register, we have moved from
a problem in a probabilistic class to a problem in the
deterministic class of the same complexity.
7.7 Application to Symmetric Ciphers
Simon’s algorithm has been used to attack symmetric-
key ciphers, retrieving the key in a linear number of calls
to the encryption device. There are a number of results
that lead up to this.
Kuwakado and Morii [63] showed that, if built as a
unitary, a 3-round Feistel network with internal permu-
tations can be distinguished from a random permuta-
tion using Simon’s algorithm. If we look at the 3-round
Feistel network as a block cipher running in the Elec-
tronic Code Book (ECB) mode, it permutes a block of
the plaintext into a block of the ciphertext. If this per-
mutation is indistinguishable from a random permuta-
tion, and therefore unpredictable, the best an adversary
running a known-plain-text attack can do, is to search
the whole key space. However, if the permutation can
be distinguished from a random permutation, then we
get knowledge about the system and the key space that
we need to search shrinks. The result of Kuwakado and
Morii [63] show us that after the application of Simon’s
algorithm there should be a speed-up of the key recovery
algorithm, but not how large the speed-up is.
Kuwakado and Morii [64] later showed that Simon’s
algorithm can be used to retrieve the key from the Evan-
Mansour cipher by employing a number of queries that
are linear in the key size. This gives an exponential
speed-up to the best-known classical query bound and
a significant speed-up compared to the method using
Grover’s algorithm described in Section 6.
Kaplan et al. [65] extended this to other ciphers, and
modes of operations, and showed that it can give an ex-
ponential speed-up some classical attacks that require
finding collisions.
As always, for this to work, the encrypting device
needs to be re-cast as a unitary operation and the key
needs to be stored in the device. Note that here, the key
is a classical parameter to the encryption device, and
not under control of an attacker or entered as a quan-
tum state in contrast to the known-plaintext-attack us-
ing Grover’s algorithm in Section 6.6. From a practical
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point of view, this means that the key or the secret needs
to be built into the construction, just as in our previous
realization of Simon’s oracle, where s is used to build
an explicit gate array. Furthermore, an attacker is able
to retrieve the built-in secret because it is built into the
dynamics of a physical system. Again, when comparing
with the previous realization, it is clear that the secret
leaks through another degree of freedom in the physical
system, and not through the computational basis that
holds the cleartext or ciphertext.
The conclusion is that this is a side-channel attack,
i.e., an attack made available because of a specific imple-
mentation — not an attack on the protocol itself. Cryp-
tographic protocols that are vulnerable to side-channel
attacks are in general not considered broken, since all
are more or less vulnerable depending on how they are
implemented.
With that said, the results of [63–65] are important
examples of new and innovative ways of performing side-
channel attacks, in this case using a quantum-computer
implementation of the cipher, and having the owner of
the secret hide it as a parameter within the quantum
computer. We agree with the recommendation of [64],
that classical ciphers should not be implemented in quan-
tum circuits, because of potentially introducing side-
channel attacks. A large part of modern cryptography
is to prevent the creation of unintended side channels
in new encryption devices. It is still an open question
whether QSL enables a similar side-channel attack on
these kinds of systems, but for the same reason as with
quantum computation, we would still advise against us-
ing QSL systems for encryption or decryption purposes.
8 Shor’s Algorithm Factoring 15
Shor’s algorithm [17, 18] is one of the quantum algo-
rithms that solve a computational problem with real-
world applications: to efficiently find a factor in a com-
posite number N . We have seen that Deutsch-Jozsa’s
and Simon’s algorithms can be run in polynomial time
on a classical Turing machine; the natural continuation
is to attempt integer factorization, whose hardness is one
of the most widely believed conjectures in computer sci-
ence.
While large high-fidelity quantum computers are still
far away, several experimental realizations of Shor’s al-
gorithm for small numbers have been presented [66–72].
These are all very impressive demonstration of quantum
optimal control, but an experimental realization of Shor’s
algorithm with the currently available technology is de-
manding and this has led to the need for vast simplifi-
cations in the algorithm. There are essentially two pa-
rameters subject to optimization: bit-depth and circuit-
depth (see Ref.[57] and the citations therein). Also, the
approximate quantum Fourier transform [73] is crucial
for scalability. In this optimization procedure, one has
to be careful not to over-simplify, or make explicit (or
implicit) use of knowledge about the solution [74]. We
will avoid such over-simplifications by using an identical
circuit for factoring 15 as in Ref. [66].
Shor’s algorithm uses a quantum subroutine that
finds the order (or period) of an element a in the mul-
tiplicative group of integers modulo N . Here, the or-
der is the smallest integer r such that ar = 1 (mod
N). This is sufficient information to find a factor in N .
The algorithm makes use of an input-register quantum
state, containing an integer x, and an output-register in
which modular exponentiation ax (mod N) is computed.
By creating a superposition in the input-register using
the quantum Fourier transform, performing the calcu-
lation, and then inverting the transform, one can with
high probability retrieve sufficient information to calcu-
late the order (see Figure 42).
|0〉 /2n F F †
|1〉 /n a
x (%N)
Figure 42: Circuit diagram of the quantum subroutine
used in Shor’s algorithm. A 2n-qubit register is initi-
ated in the zero-state |0〉, and an n-qubit register in |1〉.
Basis change of the input-register part of the controlled
modular exponentiation operator allow for sampling a
probability distribution with peaks at s/r.
More specifically, this procedure let us sample from
a probability distribution with peaks at s/r, where s is
uniformly distributed over the integers between 0 and
r − 1. Ideally, the peaks are completely localized to s/r
but in most cases there is peak broadening due to Fourier
leakage, and to ensure that the measurement yields a bi-
nary fraction sufficiently close to s/r, the input-register
needs to be at least 2n qubits in size, where n is the size
of the output-register which is large enough to perform
calculations mod N . The full procedure to retrieve r is
as follows:
Algorithm 8.1: (Shor [17]) Proceed with the fol-
lowing steps to retrieve a factor of a composite num-
ber with high probability.
1. Pick at random an integer a 6= ±1 modulo N . If
GCD(a,N) is a nontrivial factor of N , we have a
solution.
2. Otherwise generate, setup, and run the quantum
Subroutine (8.1) (Also shown in Figure 42) to
find a candidate for s/r.
3. Use the continued fraction expansion to retrieve
r (or a factor in r when s and r has a common
factor).
4. If r is even, one of GCD(ar/2 ± 1, N) may be a
nontrivial factor of N . This happens with high
probability.
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Subroutine 8.1: (Shor [17]) Proceed with the fol-
lowing steps to find a candidate for the quotient s/r
where s is random and r is the period of ax mod N .
1. Prepare a 2n-qubit query register in the state
|0〉 and an n-qubit answer register in the state
|1〉.
2. Apply the quantum Fourier transform to the
query register.
3. Apply the specific unitary Ua,N |x〉 |y〉 =
|x〉 |y × ax mod N〉.
4. Apply the inverse quantum Fourier transform
to the query register.
5. Measure the query register to retrieve a candi-
date for s/r.
Return that candidate for s/r.
For N = 15 the possible integers that can occur
in steps 2-4 are a ∈ {2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13} (see Figure 43).
Note that deliberately choosing a to give a short period
that is easy to find, would be another example of over-
simplifying the algorithm. It is therefore important that
the element a is chosen randomly [see e.g., 74]. In what
follows, we have used all alternatives; this is of course
only possible because of the small N used.
×1 (mod 15) ×2 (mod 15) ×4 (mod 15) ×7 (mod 15)
×8 (mod 15) ×11 (mod 15) ×13 (mod 15)
Figure 43: Controlled modular multipliers that occur
in Shor’s algorithm.
Some useful simplifications are allowed. The Fourier
transform on the input can be exchanged for the Walsh-
Hadamard transform (Hadamard gates), while the in-
verse Fourier transform can be implemented through
Hadamards followed by classically controlled single qubit
rotations [75]; by advancing the measurement of the con-
trolling qubit and using the outcome as a classical con-
trol (see Figure 44). This decouples the 2n qubits of
the input-register in the sense that the procedure of
preparation, transformation, and measurement can be
performed individually on each qubit. It is common to
perform these single qubit procedures in sequence on one
single qubit, a method known as qubit recycling, which
reduces the overall bit-depth from 3n to n+1 at the cost
of circuit-depth.
|0〉 H . . . H
...
... . . .
... . . .
|0〉 H . . . R25 . . . H
|0〉 H . . . R26 . . . R2 H
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Figure 44: Shor’s algorithm with semiclassical inverse
Fourier transform. Note that ×22 ≡ ×72 ≡ ×82 ≡
×132 ≡ ×41 and ×42 ≡ ×112 ≡ ×1 (mod 15), so that
many of the controlled multiplications will be identities.
Therefore, most rotations R2k will never be applied (in
the ideal situation), in fact only the very last R2 opera-
tion can ever occur.
The demonstration of Monz et al [66] is the most
advanced to date. They refrain from “compiling” the
circuitry, and use non-Clifford group operations which is
necessary for a scalable version. One simplification Monz
et al do use is restricting the resolution of the input-
register from 2n qubits to three qubits. This is possible
because all elements in the multiplicative group mod 15
have power-of-two periods, and they only verify the be-
havior of the exponentiation until and including the first
that is equivalent to the identity map (see Figure 43).
It has been argued [76] that the three-bit precision
of Monz et al is insufficient since 2n bits are required
for the algorithm to overcome Fourier leakage in gen-
eral, and to succeed with a bounded error rate required
for scalability. However, for N = 15 there is no Fourier
leakage because of the power-of-two periods and this is
clear when building the quantum gate array. Therefore,
measuring more qubits will only add noise and not pre-
cision. The distribution is completely described at two
bits of precision. On the other hand, this also means
that the process of generating the circuitry solves the
factoring problem, since it is enough to know at which
point the identity emerges from exponentiation. Thus,
the experiment [66] is not so much about factoring 15
through Shor’s algorithm, but more a verification that
their quantum (ion-trap) realization is good enough to
approximate the ideal quantum statistics even when not
using a compiled circuit.
We now present an experimental realization of Shor’s
algorithm, factoring 15, using QSL. Please note that the
motivation for doing this is not to factor 15, but to com-
pare our completely classical construction with the cur-
rent state-of-the-art quantum implementations, and to
show that QSL is applicable outside the oracle paradigm.
We use basically the same algorithmic setup, but employ
the semiclassical Fourier transform without qubit recy-
cling, and the emerging identity operations are of course
all omitted. Our setup is similar to that of Monz et
al. (see Figure 44) and uses the multiplication operators
from Markov et al. [57], but avoids precomputing their
effect on the initial state (see Figure 43).
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Figure 45: QSL realization of Shor’s algorithm. For
the case a = 8 so that the modular multipliers used are,
×82 ≡ ×4 (mod 15), and ×8 (mod 15).
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Figure 46: Estimated output probability. Point esti-
mates of the output probability distributions of the sub-
routine, for the non-trivial elements in the multiplicative
group of integers mod 15. Each distribution is estimated
from 106 samples.
We have chosen a hardware implementation in 2-
complementary reversible pass-transistor logic, specifi-
cally using transmission gates [77]. These are built using
currently available semiconductor technology and oper-
ate in the digital regime using TTL levels. The random
number generators of the source and measurement de-
vices use high-gain analog amplifiers to sample random
bits from noise at a reverse-biased PN junction.
The output probability distributions are estimated
from 106 samples for each element a ∈ {2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13}
(see Figure 46). We see that the distributions for a =
7, 8, 13 are not uniform over their support, as predicted
by quantum theory, but they are closer to the ideal dis-
tributions than any other implementation that we know
of. To analyze their performance, Monz et al. used
the square statistical overlap (SSO) as a fidelity mea-
sure. Our implementation reaches an SSO of {0.9999(1),
0.9999(1), 0.933(3), 0.984(2), 0.9999(1), 0.984(2)} for
a ∈ {2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13} respectively (statistical errors as
one standard deviation). Notably, our implementation
gives the same probability (0.5) of returning a good can-
didate for r as the ideal quantum subroutine.
Like any other physical implementation of quantum
gates, our simulation suffers from systematic errors. This
will result in an error propagation that suppresses the
amount of useful information that we can retrieve when
scaling the algorithm to larger numbers — even though
there is no practical restriction for doing so. Further
work is needed, beyond the scope of this paper, to reduce
these systematic errors, perhaps by altering the frame-
work or using error correcting techniques, so that it be-
comes useful for larger instances.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have looked at the QSL simulation
framework, which is efficiently simulatable on a classi-
cal Turing machine and can at the same time repro-
duce many quantum phenomena. These phenomena in-
clude results from quantum query complexity in which
the query complexity is exactly the same in QSL as in
quantum theory. In the circuit model there is only a con-
stant overhead in classical resources, which in turn gives
a polynomial time simulation in a classical probabilistic
Turing machine.
Using this approach there is no quantum advan-
tage with respect to the QSL implementation for the
Deutsch-Jozsa, Bernstein-Vazirani, or Simon’s
problem. ForGrover search QSL has a slight advantage
over the classical case, reaching O(2n/n) queries com-
pared to O(2n) in the classical case, while the quantum
algorithm retains an advantage using O(2n/2) queries.
Outside the oracle paradigm, the choices made in the
QSL construction gives less of an advantage, but does
enable small examples, which we have illustrated by sim-
ulating the setup of two recent experimental realizations
of Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms.
Regarding Deutsch-Jozsa, Bernstein-Vazirani,
and Simon’s problem we can also conclude that no gen-
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uinely quantum resources are required, i.e., that the re-
sources used can be efficiently simulated on a classical
Turing machine. The reason is that the resources needed
are also available in QSL. The inclusion of phase infor-
mation in QSL gives rise to phenomena that have previ-
ously been suggested resources for the quantum advan-
tage, including superposition, interference, and some as-
pects of entanglement among others. We believe that it
is more appropriate to assign the speed-up in these cases
to the ability to store, process and retrieve information in
another information-carrying degree-of-freedom, in this
case the phase degree-of-freedom.
Functions in quantum computation are realized as
dynamics from physical systems to physical systems, and
not as mere function maps from bits to bits. Trac-
ing the full dynamics of such a physical system may
require keeping track of an exponential amount of in-
formation. The available efforts to efficiently trace the
dynamics used in quantum computation usually adopt
a top-down approach, restricting the available dynamics
until the necessary information can be efficiently traced.
For instance, the stabilizer subtheory is the restriction to
Pauli measurements and Clifford gates, and this can be
traced efficiently. The approach presented here instead
uses a bottom-up approach, that extends the standard
function maps to also encompass the phase information
within each individual qubit. Even though simulating
each qubit with a single classical bit is not enough, we
have found that two classical bits per qubit gets us very
far.
This clearly shows that comparing bounds from clas-
sical query complexity with those from quantum query
complexity does not provide conclusive evidence for a
quantum advantage. A quantum oracle is so vastly
different from a classical oracle that it is questionable
whether they are comparable at all. The comparison
between quantum oracle and QSL oracle is much more
well-founded, since both enable a choice between retriev-
ing function value or additional information related to
the function, stored in the phase degree of freedom. All
it takes to enable the same behavior for a QSL oracle
as a quantum oracle, in the above examples, is a single
bit of extra (phase) information, i.e., a constant over-
head. This leaves a lot of headroom for improvement,
as allowing for a polynomial overhead will enable a more
accurate simulation.
In conclusion, the enabling root cause (resource) for
the quantum speed-up in the mentioned examples is not
superposition, interference, entanglement, contextuality,
the continuity of quantum state space, or quantum coher-
ence. It is the ability to store, process and retrieve infor-
mation in an additional information-carrying degree-of-
freedom in the physical system being used as information
carrier.
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A Constant and Balanced Func-
tions for Three Bits of Input
Circuit representation of all constant and balanced func-
tions for 3-bit input. The values below each gate ar-
ray are the function values concatenated in the order
f(7)f(6)f(5)f(4)f(3)f(2)f(1)f(0).
Toffolis: 0, CNOTS: 0
00000000
X
11111111
Toffolis: 0, CNOTS: 1
X
00001111
X
00110011
X
01010101
X
10101010
X
11001100
X
11110000
Toffolis: 0, CNOTS: 2
X X
00111100
X X
01011010
X X
01100110
X X
10011001
X X
10100101
X X
11000011
Toffolis: 0, CNOTS: 3
X X X
01101001
X X X
10010110
Toffolis: 1, CNOTS: 1
X X
00011110
X X
00101101
X X
00110110
X X
00111001
X X
01001011
X X
01010110
X X
01011001
X X
01100011
X X
01100101
X X
01101010
X X
01101100
X X
01111000
46
X X
10000111
X X
10010011
X X
10010101
X X
10011010
X X
10011100
X X
10100110
X X
10101001
X X
10110100
X X
11000110
X X
11001001
X X
11010010
X X
11100001
Toffolis: 1, CNOTS: 3
X X
X X
00011011
X X
X X
00011101
X X
X X
00100111
X X
X X
00101110
X X
X X
00110101
X X
X X
00111010
X X
X X
01000111
X X
X X
01001110
X X
X X
01010011
X X
X X
01011100
X X
X X
01110010
X X
X X
01110100
X X
X X
10001011
X X
X X
10001101
X X
X X
10100011
X X
X X
10101100
X X
X X
10110001
X X
X X
10111000
X X
X X
11000101
X X
X X
11001010
X X
X X
11010001
X X
X X
11011000
X X
X X
11100010
X X
X X
11100100
Toffolis: 1, CNOTS: 5
X X
X X
X X
00010111
X X
X X
X X
00101011
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X X
X X
X X
01001101
X X
X X
X X
01110001
X X
X X
X X
10001110
X X
X X
X X
10110010
X X
X X
X X
11010100
X X
X X
X X
11101000
B Error Probability for Different
Constructions of the Majority
Function
In this section we calculate the error probability for the
QSL simulation for when the four different construc-
tions of the majority function (see Figure 28) is used as
balanced in the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm. We start
with the state after the Walsh-Hadamard transform,
(r2, 0) (r1, 0) (r0, 0) (rt, 1). For clarity we omit the target
QSL-bit, keeping in mind that its phase bit is set.
For the construction in Figure 28A as the function,
the simulation follows.
(r2, 0) (r1, 0) (r0, 0)
→ (r2, r1r0) (r1, r2r0) (r0, r2r1)
→ (r2, 0) (r1, r0) (r0, r1)
→ (r2, r1r0) (r1, r0 ⊕ r2r1) (r0, r1 ⊕ r2r1)
→ (r2, r1 ⊕ r0) (r1, r2 ⊕ r0) (r0, r2 ⊕ r1)
(184)
After the Walsh-Hadamard transform and measurement
we see that the simulation will wrongfully answer con-
stant if r1⊕r0, r2⊕r0, and r2⊕r1 all equate to zero. This
will happen only if r2 = r1 = r0 = 0 or r2 = r1 = r0 = 1,
and since r2, r1 and r0 are equally weighted random bits
the error probability becomes 1/4.
For the construction in Figure 28B as the function,
the simulation follows.
(r2, 0) (r1, 0) (r0, 0)
→ (r2, 0) (r1 ⊕ r0, 0) (r0, 0)
→ (r2 ⊕ r0, 0) (r1 ⊕ r0, 0) (r0, 0)
→ (r2 ⊕ r0, 0) (r1 ⊕ r0, 0) (r0 ⊕ (r2 ⊕ r0)(r1 ⊕ r0), 0)
→ (r2 ⊕ r0, 0) (r1 ⊕ r0, 0) (r0 ⊕ (r2 ⊕ r0)(r1 ⊕ r0), 1)
→ (r2 ⊕ r0, r1 ⊕ r0) (r1 ⊕ r0, r2 ⊕ r0) (r0, 1)
→ (r2, r1 ⊕ r0) (r1 ⊕ r0, r2 ⊕ r0) (r0, r1 ⊕ r0)
→ (r2, r1 ⊕ r0) (r1, r2 ⊕ r0) (r0, r2 ⊕ r1)
(185)
After the Walsh-Hadamard transform and measurement
we see that the simulation will wrongfully answer con-
stant if r1 ⊕ r0, r2 ⊕ r0, and r2 ⊕ r1 all equate to zero,
but this cannot happen. If we try to assign values and
still obey the constraint we will reach a contradiction.
Therefore, the error probability is 0.
For the construction in Figure 28C as the function,
the simulation follows.
(r2, 0) (r1, 0) (r0, 0)
→ (r2, r1) (r1, r2) (r0, 0)
→ (r2, r1) (r1, r2 ⊕ r0) (r0, r1)
→ (r2, r1 ⊕ r0) (r1, r2 ⊕ r0) (r0, r2 ⊕ r1)
(186)
After the Walsh-Hadamard transform and measurement
we see that the simulation will wrongfully answer con-
stant if r1 ⊕ r0, r2 ⊕ r0, and r2 ⊕ r1 all equate to zero.
Again, this will only happen if r2 = r1 = r0 = 0 or
r2 = r1 = r0 = 1, and since r2, r1 and r0 are equally
weighted random bits the error probability becomes 1/4.
For the construction in Figure 28B as the function,
the simulation follows.
(r2, 0) (r1, 0) (r0, 0)
→ (r2 ⊕ r0, 0) (r1, 0) (r0, 0)
→ (r2 ⊕ r0, 0) (r1, 0) (r0, 1)
→ (r2 ⊕ r0, r0) (r1, 0) (r0, r2 ⊕ r0)
→ (r2, r1 ⊕ r0) (r1, r2 ⊕ r0) (r0, r2 ⊕ r0)
(187)
We see that the simulation will wrongfully answer con-
stant if r1 ⊕ r0, r2 ⊕ r0, and r2 ⊕ r0 all equate to zero.
This is a contradiction since r2⊕r0 6= r2⊕r0. Therefore,
the error probability is 0.
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